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Abstract
The onset of new and emerging threats to peace and security in West Africa has added
another layer of threat to security in West Africa. There is a need for research on the
interconnectedness among existing and new and emerging threats to security in the
region. The purpose of this study was to explore the Economic Community of West
African States’ (ECOWAS’) approach to its regional security management strategy. The
punctuated equilibrium theory and policy feedback theory were used to conceptualize the
problem within the context of ECOWAS’ policy inertia and the wide range of security
and sociopolitical dynamics in the region. The research questions focused on assessing
the effectiveness of ECOWAS’ approach to security management in West Africa. The
research was a qualitative exploratory case study based on a grounded theory design.
Purposive and snowball sampling techniques were used to recruit 12 regional security
experts from ECOWAS headquarters and regional peace and security institutions in
Ghana and Nigeria. Data collection techniques included in-depth interviews and
document analysis. The findings showed that the ECOWAS’ security management
strategy, which was effective during the internecine conflicts, was no longer successful
with the advent of new and emerging threats to security in the region. Recommendations
of this study include developing ECOWAS strategic concept for security management
and drafting an ECOWAS framework for accountability. The study has implications for
positive social change (e.g., improving perceptions of security among West African
citizens) and policy making and professional practice (e.g., supporting an integrated
conceptual approach to security management that is threat focused).
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
The security situation in West Africa keeps deteriorating. Both directly affected
countries and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional
organization with the remit for management for regional peace and security, are
overwhelmed by the menace from terrorist actors and other entities. ECOWAS has, in the
past, been successful in managing intrastate conflicts in the region through troop
deployments and mediation (Akokpari, 2016).
However, with the inception of globalization and the post-September 11 world
order, new and emerging security threats from terrorism, cybercrimes, and organized
transnational and cross-border crimes have engulfed West Africa (Kieh & Kalu, 2013;
Marc et al., 2015). Thus, the region faces two layers of security challenges. On one side
are postcolonial and post-Cold War intrastate conflicts. On the other are new and
emerging security threats instigated by globalization and September 11 that have, over
time, intertwined and confounded the region's security threat variables (Onuoha &
Ezirim, 2013).
ECOWAS, as the recognized regional institution with the mandate of ensuring
regional peace and security, needs to have robust strategies to be effective (Akokpari,
2016; Marc et al., 2015). The main implication for social change for the study is the
insight it provides on ECOWAS’ effectiveness in ensuring regional peace and security.
This knowledge may help policy makers and security professionals in developing a more
cohesive approach to ensuring safety and security in the West Africa region. Another
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impact this study may have is its replicability and adaptability by other regional
organizations and national security institutions.
In this chapter, I provide a contextual overview of the geography and how the
demography, history, and the political systems of West Africa have evolved. I reflect on
the complex and buoyant social, political, commercial, and agricultural policy of
indigenous West Africa, through the era of Trans-Atlantic trade and the partitioning of
Africa. The discussion shows how these variables interrelate with world order and
cataclysms to shape the region’s troubling security landscape. The chapter also includes a
discussion of ECOWAS’ achievements and challenges and how it became a crucial
player in the region's security management system. The chapter also includes the problem
statement, purpose, research questions, theoretical foundation, conceptual framework,
nature, definitions, assumptions, scope and delimitations, limitations, and significance of
the study.
Background
West Africa has experienced unique effects from a series of tumultuous global
events from the days of slavery, colonialism, independence struggles, post-colonialism,
the Cold War, post-Cold War, and globalization, to the current era of the post-September
11 Global War on Terror (Baylis, Smith & Owens 2017; Pham, 2014). Each of these
cataclysmic events affected the region’s security landscape in a peculiar way. When the
Liberian civil war commenced in the 1990s, ECOWAS seized the initiative as a regional
organization to send peace enforcement troops to the country. That marked the beginning
of ECOWAS’ interference in security matters in the region (Alao, 2017; Kabia, 2016).
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Since then, ECOWAS has gotten intricately involved in security issues affecting member
states. ECOWAS peace operations in the region include the conflicts in Sierra Leone,
Guinea-Bissau, La Cote D'Ivoire, Mali, and the Gambian political crisis (Hirsch & Hirch
2018).
Although ECOWAS has had significant successes in the management of security
in West Africa, the organization has so far operated only in the realms of peace
operations and conflict mediation (Akokpari, 2016; Lar, 2009; Odobo et al., 2017). As
new and emerging threats to peace and security in the region worsen without a plausible
regional approach, it became apparent that West Africa's security challenges were going
to deteriorate further (Kieh & Kalu, 2013; von Soest, & De Juan, 2018). Even though the
outcomes of the changing security dynamics were anticipated, ECOWAS’ operational
concept in managing security in the region remains problematic (Onuoha & Ezirim,
2013; Tejpar & de Albuquerque 2015).
The continuous worsening of the security situation in West Africa has debilitating
effects on the already fragile humanitarian and economic conditions and fledgling
democratic governance of countries in the region (Collier, 2017; United Nations Security
Council, 2017). According to the United Nations Security Council Report (2012), the
combination of the civil wars and the emergence of new threats to peace and security in
the region “have significantly diminished human capital, social infrastructure and
productive national development assets” (p. 2). Also, Human Rights Watch, in its
briefing paper on West Africa to the UN Security Council in 2003 indicated that, there
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were increased cases of sexual and gender-based violence and reprisal killings, among
others, across the sub-region (Human Rights Watch, 2013).
In conducting this study, I sought to contribute an alternative approach to
ECOWAS’ conflict management strategies through a framework of integrated
assessments of the two layers of threats to the region. An alternate approach can reveal
the interconnectedness between the two threat layers for a nuanced evaluation to bring
them under control (see New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness,
2018). When the threats interactions are established, effective measures to address the
problem can be deduced (FES Africa Department, 2017).
Brief History of West Africa
West Africa lies between latitudes 5° and 20° North and longitudes 16° West and
15° East on the globe (Maps of the World, 2017). It is bordered to the South by the Gulf
of Guinea and to the North by the Sahara Desert. The region has an approximate area of
eight million square kilometers (Food and Agriculture Organization Technical Papers,
1985). West Africa is ethnically diverse region with 17 countries and has a population of
approximately 382 million (Economic Commission for Africa, 2016; Worldometers,
2018). The dominant groups in the region are Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, Fulani, Akan, Ijaw,
Mandinka, Ewe, and Wolof (Bloom & Sachs, 1999, p. 277; Michel & Zwang, 2006).
West African countries, with the exception of Cape Verde, are among those with
the world's fastest population growth rate (Bello-Schünemann, 2017; United Nations
Economic Commission for Africa [UNECA], 2016, p. 5; Worldometers, 2018).
According to United Nations (UN), Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
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Population Division, as referenced by Worldometers (2018), West Africa is home to 5%
of the world’s population, with an annual growth rate of 2.69%. The region is rich with
many natural resources. Some of these resources include gold, coal, diamond, aluminum,
pozzolana, fish, timber, uranium, oil and gas, titanium, and iron ore (Al Jazeera, 2018;
ECOWAS, 2015a).
Before the Trans-Atlantic trade and the partitioning of Africa in the nineteenth
century, West Africa had a complex and buoyant social, political, commercial, and
agricultural system (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou 2016). The region then had wellorganized vast empires like the Songhay, Mali, Ghana, and Borno; states and many
smaller chiefdoms and acephalous communities (Blakemore & Cooksey, 2017, p. 11;
Davidson, 2014; Wilfahrt, 2018). Although relations among the various states were
sometimes fractious due to territorial expansionism, cultural diffusion and commercial
activities were vibrant. Technology transfer was fluid even beyond the Sahel to the
Mediterranean and South across the forest to the coastal Atlantic areas (Hopkins, 2014).
The onset of the Trans-Atlantic slave trade by European merchants from 16th to
the 19th centuries not only changed the interstate and intercommunal economic dynamics
and also altered the socio-cultural stratifications in West Africa (Nwokeji, 2010). The
trade flourished on both demand and supply sides. It also gave a stimulus to the culture of
violence and internecine warfare to feed the lucrative industry (p. 201).
As the slavery industry thrived, competition and acrimony arose among the
European nations who scrambled for territories in West Africa. Eventually, the
Europeans agreed amicably to partition the region (but applied to the entire continent)
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into spheres of influence, protectorates, colonies, and free-trade-areas at the Berlin
Conference on February 26, 1885 (Chamberlain, 2016, p xii; Michalopoulos &
Papaioannou, 2011, p. 1; Pakenham, 2015, Sect 14). The colonial borders were
capriciously drawn based on already acquired territories by the feuding European nations.
They disregarded ethnic homogeneity, and the socio-political exclusivity of the various
communities (Pakenham, 2015). Figure 1 includes a map that illustrates the partitioning
of Africa as a result of the Berlin Conference.
Figure 1
Map showing how Africa was partitioned in Berlin Conference - 1884.

Note. Adapted from “The Berlin conference on Africa: 1884-1885,” by D.J.P. Waldie,
2019, Timewise Traveller, para 7. Retrieved from
https://www.timewisetraveller.co.uk/berlin2.html
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The creation of artificial barriers in the region restricted socialization among
communities that were once together to the extent that, villages and families got
separated from each other (Miles, 2014; Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2011, p. 29).
Different official cover names were even ascribed to the same ethnic groups in the region
to distinguish them from their kin at the other side of the boundaries by the British and
the French colonialists (Asiwaju, 1985). For example, the Yorubas in British Nigeria
were called Nago in French Dahomey, the Fulanis in British colonies were called Peuls in
French colonies across the region, and the Baydyarankes in French Guinea were called
the Bambara in Portuguese Guinea (p. 3).
Also, thriving economic activities were negatively affected by customs charges
and immigration documents required for crossing wares to a central market that served
the once united community (Miles, 2015, p. 27). Traditional rulers around the border
towns and villages, in some cases, ignored the imposed boundaries. They continued to
mutually recognize original ownership of lands and farms overlapping into jurisdictions
across borders in line with precolonial precincts and customary laws (Raunet, 2016).
Table 1 includes a list of partitioned West African ethnic groups.
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Table 1
Partitioned West African Ethnic Groups
Serial

Country*

Ethnic group

1

Benin-Nigeria

Adja, Yoruba, Borgu, Hausa, Fulani

2

Cameroon-

Kanembu, Shua Arabs, Adamawa, Okoi, Wakura, Matakam,

Nigeria

Gude, Veve, Jibu, Chamba, Ododop, Efik Mandara,

3

Gambia-Senegal

Wolof, Pular, Serer Mandinka, Jola, Karoninka, Manjago, Balanta

4

Ghana-Togo

Ewe, Agotime, Akposso, Konkomba, Aufo, Moba

5

Ghana- Burkina

Mossi, Dagara, Sisala, Kusasi, Dyula, Birifor, Padon, Mankana,

Faso

Bissa, Aculo

Ghana-Ivory

Sanwi, Afema, Lobi

6

Coast
7

Guinea-Sierra

Mende, Susu, Baga

Leone
8

Nigeria-Niger

Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri

*Former French colonies in Italics; Former British colonies are without emphasis.
Note. Adapted from “Scars of partition: postcolonial legacies in French and British
borderlands,” W.F.S. Miles, 2014, Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1d9nmvp
Independent West Africa and the Vestiges of Colonialism
The partitioning of West Africa and its subsequent colonization altered the
existing socio-political mosaic by redefining the identity of the people in the region. The
residual effects of arbitrary drawing of borderlines and superimposition of the various
European value systems on the people through language acculturalization were still at
play in shaping the region's polity and economic arrangements (Harbeson, 2017;
Asiwaju, 1985, p.213). Even as West African countries tried to ignore territorial
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boundaries to forge free trade across their borders, they still grappled with lingering
Francophone-Anglophone competition based regional trade union divide. (UEMOA,
2017; ECOWAS, 2016a).
Formation of the Economic Community of West African States
ECOWAS is a 15-member state regional organization for West African countries
that aims to promote economic integration across the region. Although ECOWAS was
established in 1975, it traces its antecedent to an agreement between President Kwame
Nkrumah of Ghana and President Sékou Touré of Guinea to create a Union of
Independent African States (UIAS) in 1958 (DeLancey, 1966). The UIAS was formed
between 1961 and 1963 and later renamed the Union of African States (UAS) to include
Mali in a Pan-Africanist move to create what came to be known as the Ghana-GuineaMali Union. The union's objective was to forge a common diplomatic representation and
harmonized economic and monetary policies of the former British and French colonies
(DeLancey, 1966; Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union-Union of the African States, 1962).
Subsequently, President William Tubman of Liberia mooted a West African regional
arrangement in 1964 with Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone (Adeleke,
1995).
All the initial attempts at forging an integration arrangement for the region failed.
It was instead in April 1972 when the heads of state of Nigeria and Togo, General
Yakubu Gowon, and General Nyasingbe Eyadema took a more serious approach by
regenerating interest in the concept and following up with visits to countries in the
region. They managed to get the consent of their counterparts toward establishing the
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regional organization and that eventually culminated in the signing of 'Treaty of Lagos'
on May 28, 1975, with a mandate of promoting economic integration in all fields of
activity of the constituting countries (ECOWAS, 2016b, p. 6).
ECOWAS mandate was later expanded with a revised treaty in 1993 to
strengthen political cooperation and accelerate the implementation of the economic
integration policies among member states (UNECA, 2016). The agreement was followed
up in the year 2000 by a Non-Aggression Protocol and a Protocol on Mutual Defense
Assistance that led to the formation of an ECOWAS Standby Force (Okon & Williams,
2018, p.47; ECOWAS, 2015b, para 1). The new treaty set out goals of a common
economic market and a single currency and restructured the organization to give effect to
the revised objectives with the introduction of new institutions and specialized agencies
(ECOWAS, 2016c).
ECOWAS Membership
ECOWAS membership was opened exclusively for West African countries with
geopolitical and cultural ties (ECOWAS, 2016d). ECOWAS started as a 15-member state
organization and was joined by Cape Verde Islands in 1977 to increase its membership to
16 encompassing the entire region. Mauritania, however, withdrew its membership in
2000 to join the Arab Maghreb Union making the organization revert to its original 15member state status (Kamal-Deen, 2015, p. 20; UNECA, 2016). ECOWAS members,
therefore, constitute the following countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia,
Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Cape Verde,
Guinea, and Niger (ECOWAS, 2016d).
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Morocco, even though not geographically belonging to the region, formally
applied in 2017 to join the union (Fabiani, 2018, para 5). "Morocco's bid, however, faced
strong objections from several West African civil society organizations and economic
interest groups" (para 6). Morocco's apparent rejection to be part of ECOWAS goes to
confirm the close cultural and geopolitical underpinnings that define nature and
membership criteria for the organization. Figure 2 shows the countries that are in
ECOWAS.
Figure 2.
Political map of ECOWAS countries.

Note. Adapted from “The countries of western Africa,” Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc.
Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/place/western-Africa#/media/1/640491
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ECOWAS Vision Aim and Objectives
The primary aim of ECOWAS is to foster interstate economic and political
cooperation among member states (ECOWAS, 2016b, para7). The organization is also
committed to enhancing the socioeconomic development of its member states by
promoting economic integration in all fields of activity in the region (USAID, 2016, p. 1).
Before the partition of Africa and subsequent colonization, trade among the communities
had been smoother with free movement of people and commodities as the region was
considered the best in the world (ECOWAS, 2016b, p. 7). According to ECOWAS
(2016b), about three percent of the region's population live outside countries of their
origin among the community (p. 7).
Realizing the need to breach the artificial barriers to free movement of people
and commodities in the region, ECOWAS Vision 2020 was adopted by a resolution in
2007 to reflect an "ECOWAS of People." This concept replaced the existing "ECOWAS
of States" to give effect to a renewed impetus toward deepening interaction among people
in the region (ECOWAS Vision 2020, 2010, pp 1&2). ECOWAS Vision 2020 seeks to:
"To create a borderless, peaceful, prosperous and cohesive region, built on good
governance and where people can access and harness its enormous resources through the
creation of opportunities for sustainable development and environmental preservation"
(p.2).
The ECOWAS Revised Treaty had 15 objectives (2010, Art 3). The objectives
led to the restructuring of a new structure to support, coordinate, harmonize, and promote
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activities that was to facilitate the implementation of the organization's mandate while
keeping the attainment of its vision alive and on track (Art 3).
ECOWAS Structure
ECOWAS has metamorphosed through three significant structural developments
since its establishment in 1975. The first being in 1993 when the treaty was revised to
widen the scope of its provisions and strengthen the organization's mandate with
additional powers and provision commensurate resource requirements (UNECA, 2015, p.
35). The second was when the Executive Secretariat was transformed into a Commission
in 2007 and given broader latitude and authority to fast-track the regional integration
process (p.11). The third was the smart leveraging of the revised treaty to expand the
technical commissions from four to eight and to operationalize them. Some of these
technical commissions' remits require member states to surrender some political and
sovereign authority. For example, West African Monetary Agency (WAMA), West
African Monetary Institute (WAMI), the ECOWAS Brown Card insurance certificate,
and ECOWAS passport and travel certificate (Abbey, 2016, para1; UNECA, 2015, pp
40&129).
ECOWAS runs on two branches; the Institution and Specialized Agencies. The
institution comprises three arms of governance, namely, the Executive, the Legislature
and the Judiciary. The governance is driven by the executive and a Chairman of the
Authority of Heads of State and Government at the apex of the structure. It also has a
Council of Ministers and a Commission with a President, a Vice President, and 13
Commissioners as part of the executive body (ECOWAS, 2016c, p. 1).
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The Community Parliament epitomizes the ECOWAS legislative body. It is
composed of 115 seats. Each member state is guaranteed five seats, and the remaining 40
shared by the country's population ratio in the community. It comprises two wings,
namely; the Bureau and the Secretariat. The Bureau has the Speaker, his Deputies, and
the Secretary-General heads the Secretariat. The two represent the governing and
administrative organs of the Community Parliament, respectively (Community
Parliament - ECOWAS, 2018).
The Community Court of Justice is the third arm of ECOWAS’ governance
architecture. "It is composed of seven independent Judges who are persons of high moral
character, appointed from among nationals of member states (Community Court of
Justice - ECOWAS, 2012, para 2). It is responsible for the "interpretation and application
of Community laws, protocols, and conventions" (ECOWAS 2016c, para 3). Over time, it
has inspired confidence in the community of member states considered as the court of last
resort (UNECA, 2016, p. 37; MyJoyOnline.com, 2017, p. 3).
Problem Statement
The problem addressed in this study was how to underpin the ECOWAS security
management framework with assessments that integrate the interconnectedness of the
existing and the new and emerging security threat layers in West Africa (New Jersey
Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, 2018; Willemse, de Bruijn, van Dijk,
Both, & Muiderman, 2015). The new and emerging threats not only present another
strand of security problem; they also inherently overlap and complicate the region's
security threat variables (Onuoha & Ezirim, 2013). ECOWAS’ security management
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strategies have failed in addressing the problem effectively (Akokpari, 2016; Marc et al.,
2015).
Many scholarly works have been done in the area of peace and security in West
Africa (Dinshak & Walnshak, 2018). However, there is a lack of research on the nexus
between postcolonial conflicts and new and emerging security threats. This gap was
made manifest by the various context-specific and less coordinated conflict prevention
frameworks that have failed to address the problem. The void has consequently allowed
the threats to fester, mutate, and further complicate the threats to peace and security in the
region (Aning, Okyere, & Abdallah, 2012; Annan 2014; Onuoha & Ezirim, 2013).
ECOWAS was initially established to foster interstate economic and political
cooperation among member states. However, the organization added security
management to its mandate to enable it to manage the growing threats to security in the
region (ECOWAS, 1999; Francis, 2009). ECOWAS indicated its commitment to regional
security management by conglomerating a force called ECOWAS Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG) to physically handle the threat with significant successes, especially in
Liberia and Sierra Leone (Cordesman, 2016; Kieh & Kalu, 2013; UN Security Council,
2011). ECOWAS has also attempted several diplomatic initiatives. These include the
ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Ammunition and other
Related Materials in June 2006, the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) in
2008, and the Political Declaration and a Common Position against Terrorism in 2013.
ECOWAS’ security management efforts notwithstanding, West Africa keeps
experiencing a continuously deteriorating security environment.
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Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to explore ECOWAS’ approach to regional security
management in West Africa. In addressing the gap in the literature, I explored the
interconnectedness among existing and new and emerging threats to security in the
region. Uncovering how the threats interrelate may enable a more nuanced analysis of the
problem for the adoption of a better approach to the region’s security management
system.
I used a qualitative methodology, relying primarily on an intertextual analysis of
documents on regional strategies, implementation plans, and political declarations. I
collected documents from relevant institutions and conducted in-depth interviews on the
phenomenon with practitioners from the ECOWAS Commission in Abuja and think tanks
at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC) in Accra,
Ghana. I also interviewed subject matter experts at the West African Network for
Peacebuilding (WANEP) in Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone to assess the
vulnerabilities of the region within the context of the threats. The interviews enabled me
to evaluate the perspectives of academics, practitioners, and subject matter experts
concerning existing and new and emerging threats in the region.
Research Questions
The overall research question (RQ1) was, how effective is ECOWAS’ current
approach to security management in the region? I also sought to answer two other RQs:
RQ2. How well is ECOWAS prepared to manage new and emerging security
problems that confront the region?

17
RQ3. What implementation challenges does ECOWAS face in its current scheme
of conflict management strategy?
Theoretical Foundation
I applied the punctuated equilibrium theory (PET), developed by paleontologists
Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould, and the policy feedback theory (PFT), which
emanated from political science from the historical institutionalist tradition (Moynihan &
Soss, 2014). PET is primarily about a policy change that is marked by “stability and
incrementalism” (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 55). This theory is most beneficial when
making decisions that involve a paradigm shift in the way a region handles security
matters. I applied PET in the study to create adequate space for an in-depth analysis of
the two layers of threats and divergent viewpoints of subject matter experts and
practitioners while ensuring the maintenance of a more focused and holistic security
arrangement. Thus, considering the magnitude of the problem, the socioeconomic
dynamics of countries involved, and their weak political will in subduing their interests
for the betterment of the entire community, the application of PET was appropriate for
the study (Aning & Pokoo, 2014; Sabatier & Weible, 2014).
The PFT provides a framework of interrelated concepts, ideas, and principles. I
formulated the framework and organized it systematically to clarify the political
implications of critical aspects of governance, such as the promotion of civic engagement
to prevent “unanticipated or unintended consequences of previous policy designs”
(Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 124). PFT also facilitates deliberations by experts and
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practitioners to enhance the synchronization of alternative options with imperatives of
governance to engender political support for implementation (Mettler & Soss, 2014).
Organizational change management requires anticipation of the challenges that
will be confronted and appropriate measures put in place (Carnall, 2018). Therefore, this
study was premised on the policy of transparent engagement and feedback concept to
enhance its rigor and thoroughness (see Sabatier & Weible, 2014). Also, the application
of PFT has had a positive impact on the development of broader policy that is acceptable
to all members of the regional community. (Moynihan & Soss, 2014). Using PFT and
PET as the theoretical basis for the research enhanced a better understanding of the level
of complementarity among ECOWAS’ strategic concepts, doctrines, and policies and
consequently improved the quality of the study's findings and analysis.
Nature of the Study
The study type was qualitative with grounded theory design. It was an exploratory
case study based on a formative evaluation research methodology. I relied primarily on
an intertextual analysis of documents on regional strategies, implementation plans, and
political declarations by ECOWAS member states. The study began with an exploration
of the prevailing security situation among member states to establish the current threats
profile and the region's vulnerabilities to them. ECOWAS architecture and strategies for
the management of its members' security were subjected to formative evaluation to assess
their inherent challenges as well as the effectiveness and efficacy of their implementation
process. This approach enhanced proffering alternative strategies and also helped in
contextualizing aspects of social value (Kozleski, 2017).
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I applied the purposive sampling and the snowball data collection technique for
this study. I conducted in-depth interviews and document analysis to gather data. I
performed both electronically and manually (for participants who declined electronic
recording) recorded interviews through one-on-one, Semi-structured, open-ended
questions with follow-ups. I also used field notes in conjunction with the interviews for
keeping track of schedules, recording vital points for follow-ups, and facilitating better
data management (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Participants for in-depth interviews were
selected based on their knowledge, expertise, and experience on the subject matter, as
well as their availability and willingness to provide the needed information (Maxwell,
2012).
The snowball technique created the flexibility for including two unanticipated
participants whose contributions were useful to the exercise. According to Maxwell
(2012), using multiple methods is a common feature of qualitative research. Duplicating
sources enhanced information gathering on different aspects of the study, and yielded the
triangulation to maximize strength and addressed the limitations of methods being
applied. The snowball technique also allowed me to depend on my primary participants’
experiences for recommendations on who else to engage as data collection progressed.
The critics of qualitative research argue that the methodology is not scientific
enough for credibility compared to quantitative methods (Sarma, 2015). On the other
hand, Marshall (1996) asserts that when a study seeks to answer humanistic "why" and
"how" questions, qualitative studies do it better (p. 522). The exploratory nature of the
research also influences the choice of qualitative methodology, requiring in-depth
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interviews to gain insight into multiple angles and to assess different sides of the problem
(Marshall, 1996, p. 253). According to Maxwell (2012), the research situation is also a
determining factor in choosing a methodology for research.
Additionally, this study enhanced a detailed and nuanced understanding of the
various groups that competed for space in security matters of the region. The qualitative
research paradigm provides better options that afforded the needed degree of immersion
into the study (Atieno, 2009). Also, the qualitative approach facilitated the
synchronization and harmonization of multiple perspectives of the various national
strategies and doctrines, respectively, for the application of best practices in conflict
management.
Definitions
Following is a list of key terms used in the study and their definitions. Appendix
A contains a list of acronyms used in the study.
Emerging security threats: New or mutated threats to security that may require an
exclusive and nonconventional approach to manage. These include radicalization,
extremism, drug trafficking, human trafficking, organized crime, terrorism, challenges to
democratic governance, and piracy. The threats could be criminal, religious extremist, or
political in nature (Cherkaoui, 2017, pp. 10, 19; Security Council Report, 2011, p. 1).
Integrated threat management: A comprehensive and nuanced approach to
identifying and analyzing multilayered threats to regional security for timely
implementation of appropriate preemptive and remedial measures for addressing the

21
menace (Korb, Duggan, & Conley, 2009; United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security,
2016).
Operational control: The authority granted to a military commander in a UN
peacekeeping operation to direct forces so that the commander may accomplish specific
missions or tasks (UN, 2009). Operational control statuses are usually limited by
function, time, or location (or a combination), to deploy units concerned and military
personnel, and to retain or assign tactical command or control of those units/personnel
(UN, 2009).
Partition of Africa: A term, also known as “scramble for Africa” and the
“Conquest of Africa,” which refers to the carving of the continent into European colonial
territories during the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885. Between 1884 and 1914, the entire
African continent except for Liberia, Ethiopia, and Somalia was shared among England,
France, Belgium, Italy, Germany, Portugal, and Spain (Courtney, 2017, p. 1; Worldfacts,
2018, p. 2).
Peace and security architecture: The combination of structures, objectives,
principles, and values, as well as decision-making and implementation processes that
compose the entire conflict management framework of an organization (Degila &
Amegan, 2019; Delegation of the European Union to Nigeria and ECOWAS, 2019).
Regional security system: A security architecture comprising military, police,
intelligence, and diplomatic engagements that is used by regional institutions in
managing security threats.
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Tasking authority: The authority that is vested in specified senior appointments of
UN peacekeeping operations to assign tasks to enable units (UN, 2009). Tasking
authority includes the authority to deploy, redeploy, and employ all or part of an enabling
unit to achieve the mission's mandate. The enabling units comprise aviation, engineering,
logistics, medical, signals, transport, and Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) units
(UN, 2009).
Assumptions
I had several assumptions in conducting the study. I assumed that a substantial
number of relevant ECOWAS headquarters staff would agree to be interviewed and offer
their objective perspectives on issues to be raised during data collection. I also assumed
that adequate funding would be available to cover travel fares and telephone bills, as well
as fees and incidentals for the conduct of interviews and the collection of other forms of
data. Finally, because of the unstable security situation at many parts of Nigeria, I
assumed that the locations for my data collection will be safe for the exercise.
Scope and Delimitations
Even though ECOWAS is credited with some interventions in the security
situation of West Africa, its successes have barely exceeded the dimension of troop's
deployment to contain intrastate conflicts (Lucey, 2016; Rodriguez, 2018). West Africa’s
security situation has continued to deteriorate due to the intricate infusion of the new and
emerging security threats with the existing interstate conflicts (Cherkaoui, 2017; Security
Council Report 2011). This study specifically explored the interconnectedness among the
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current and the new and emerging security threat layers in West Africa to enhance
ECOWAS’ security management framework.
Although this study made references to ECOWAS’ accomplishments and
challenges, it did not delve into the details of the organization’s failures and successes in
the region’s security management. It also did not assess specific national or other
supranational security management entities operating within the region. The study,
however, focused on exploring how ECOWAS could coordinate and harmonize the
plethora of security operations conducted by those national and supranational security
management entities for a better systematically organized and thoroughness in managing
the problem.
The theories applied in the study were the PET and the PFT. While the PET
provided the basis for a policy change and paradigm shift needed to drive the study, the
PFT enabled the generation of a systematic clarification of policy implications to the
interrelated concepts and ideas (Mettler & Soss, 2014; Sabatier & Weible, 2014).
Another related theory that would have been considered in the study is Innovation and
Diffusion Models (IDM). The IDM enables studies to assess policy diffusion and draw
inferences across political systems. IDM, however, works better when dealing with
socioeconomic in well-established unions like the United States and possibly, the
European Union (Heikkila & Cairney 2014).
Limitations
ECOWAS has English, French, and Portuguese speaking member states. Data
collection was, however, primarily conducted in English. Interpreters were not used since
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all participants, including those from non-Anglophone countries, opted to have the
interview in English. Still, I had to make meaning out of their linguistic limitations by
cross-checking with some of the respective non-Anglophone participants for clarity.
ECOWAS has offices in each of the 15 member states; however, onsite data collection
from ECOWAS staff for this study was conducted at the ECOWAS headquarters at
Abuja, Nigeria.
Also, due to resource constraints, secondary data were collected from think tanks,
regional institutions, and subject matter experts in Ghana and Nigeria only. A deliberate
effort was made to get the respondents' perspectives to cover all the three linguistic
segments of ECOWAS countries to include respondents from Francophone and
Lusophone countries at the ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja. Additionally, the study
applied published works and open-source data for modular referencing, contextualization,
and cross-evaluation with the UN, African Union (AU), and other regional organizations.
Significance
The onsets of the new and emerging threats to peace and security in West Africa
have increased the vulnerability of the region to security risks (Aning & Pokoo, 2014;
Marc et al., 2015). This situation has heightened tension levels, and considering the
fragility of the region's socio-cultural and geopolitical dynamics, the problem can
deteriorate beyond the capacity of ECOWAS to manage. The uncertainty of the
circumstance is not only inimical to good governance and development of democratic
culture, but it is also a disincentive to infrastructural growth and local and foreign
investments. The infrastructural growth is critical to moving the countries from the
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doldrums of economic hardships (Annual Report of ECOWAS, 2016; Runde et al.,
2016).
Significance to Practice
ECOWAS has made a significant impact on security management in West Africa.
However, the organization’s inadequate vulnerability assessments of the region,
particularly from the perspective of the combined effects of the existing and new and
emerging threats has affected its effectiveness as the security situation deteriorates
relentlessly (Maiangwa, 2017; Tejpar & de Albuquerque, 2015). Thus, this study delved
into the interconnectedness of the two layers of threats and integrated them to get a closer
shot at the threat landscape for the development of more nuanced strategic options for
ECOWAS to implement. The study was also aimed at contributing to the improvement of
the ECOWAS approach to security management in West Africa to facilitate the creation
of a conducive environment for regional and global trade and investments, development,
and better living standards for the people (Harris, 2017; Runde et al., 2016).
Significance to Theory
The significance of theories in research includes enabling me to organize ideas for
establishing the interconnections between the abstract and the wider importance of data
generated to arrive at some conclusions (Neuman, 1997; Sunday, N D). This study
applied the punctuated equilibrium and the policy feedback theories to advance
compelling reasons for the need for a paradigm shift in ECOWAS’ management of
security threats in West Africa. This study, therefore, did not just provide an alternative
to the organization's existing security management efforts but also proffered an effective
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course of action in managing the problem (Aning & Pokoo, 2014; Sabatier & Weible,
2014).
Significance to Social Change
ECOWAS, as a regional organization, serves as the first reference point for its
member states on regional security matters (De Wet, 2014; Maiangwa, 2017). Since this
study targeted the institutionalization of a more practical alternative for threat
management for ECOWAS, it will have a significant region-wide impact for social
change. Thus, ECOWAS member states will, apart from benefiting from the effective
region-wide security architecture, can also extract applicable strategies and best practices
to enhance their various national security policies.
Besides West Africa, other regional organizations with peace and security
mandate on the African continent can adapt the study. These regional organizations
include the South African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental
Authority for Development (IGAD) (comprising countries from the Horn of Africa, the
Nile Valley and the African Great Lakes) and the African Union (AU) (De Wet, 2014;
Siradag, 2012). Consequently, this study could have significant implications for positive
social change for substantial parts of Africa that share analogous security dynamics
(Burgess, 2008; Mazrui, 1996).
Summary and Transition
Chapter 1 began by providing brief insight into the geography and demography of
the region to locate the setting and provide an understanding of how the people
interrelated across the region. The chapter then traced the history of ECOWAS by
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delving into the antecedents of West Africa from the era of slavery through the
partitioning of Africa into colonial territories by some European countries up to the
independence period. Chapter 1 also introduced the nexus between the vestiges of
colonialism and the challenges ECOWAS faced as a regional institution from its
embryonic stage going forward (ECOWAS, 2016a; UEMOA, 2017). Additionally,
ECOWAS formation, vision, objectives, and structure were also highlighted.
Chapter 2 has the available literature and unveiled the gap in the study. It was an
exploratory case study based on the formative evaluation of the materials gathered. The
chapter also outlined the strategy for the search of the literature and then thematically
reviewed the significant works related to the primary research questions of this study.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
In Chapter 1, I outlined the background and context for the formation of
ECOWAS by delineating Africa's geopolitical history from the period before the TransAtlantic trade through its partitioning into colonial territories by some Western European
countries to the independence era. I also highlighted the transformation of ECOWAS
from an exclusive economic block to successes in regional peace operations efforts
(Adetula, Bereketeab, & Jaiyebo, 2016). Then, I underscored the emergence of terrorism,
cybercrimes, and organized transnational and cross-border crimes in the region as another
threat layer to the existing destructive conflicts. I went further to highlight the increasing
mutation of the two layers of threat and the need to explore their interconnectedness in
the region's security landscape (Aning & Pokoo, 2014; Marc et al., 2015).
There is extensive literature on ECOWAS’ roles in managing security in West
Africa (Dinshak & Walnshak, 2018). However, studies on security management
strategies the regional organization could employ remain limited. In this chapter, I review
relevant literature that is germane to the topic to identify the gaps and inherent
weaknesses. In this literature review, I discuss the thematic areas relative to the primary
RQs of this study. These thematic areas included colonially induced identity conflicts in
West Africa, the Cold War era and peace and security in West Africa, ECOWAS’
involvement in managing peace and security in West Africa, the effects of the War on
Terror on peace and security in West Africa, and ECOWAS’s operational peace and
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security architecture. Other themes discussed are the advent of an additional layer of
peace and security challenges in West Africa, ECOWAS’s Concept of Operations in the
management of the new and emerging threats to peace and security in West Africa, and
ECOWAS’s challenges in its management of two layers of the threat to peace and
security in West Africa. I also discuss the literature search strategy and provide more
information on the study’s theoretical foundation and conceptual framework.
Literature Search Strategy
I focused my literature search on peer-reviewed publications within a 5-year
range of 2015 to 2019. I extended the search to the previous 10 years (up to the year
2009) for critical documents and peer-reviewed articles concerning ECOWAS policies
and strategies and those of similar regional organizations. In this regard, I explored the
Walden University Library, KAIPTC Library, University of Cape Coast, and University
of Ghana databases and JSTOR for related materials to establish gaps in the literature.
I also consulted web search engines and databases such as Google Books and
Google Scholar. Additionally, I also searched for books and articles from other online
databases such as pdfdrive.net, Gutenberg.org, and archive.org. The keywords that I used
for the searches included conflict, ECOWAS, West Africa, management, regional, threats,
organization, terrorism, transnational, peace, crime, and security.
Theoretical Foundation
I combined the PET and PFT as the foundation for the theoretical framework for
the study. Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould developed the PET, and the PFT
originated from the historical institutionalist tradition of political science (Moynihan &

30
Soss, 2014). PET primarily addresses matters relating to a policy change marked by
"stability and incrementalism" (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 55). PET is most beneficial
when policy makers are taking decisions that involve a paradigm shift in the way a region
handles security matters. The theory was applied in the study because it facilitates
concurrent analysis of the two layers of threats and also accommodates exploration of
divergent viewpoints of subject matter experts and practitioners while ensuring the
maintenance of a more focused and holistic security arrangement. Thus, considering the
need for paradigm shift for ECOWAS’s response to nonconventional and asymmetric
security threats, the application of PET was appropriate for the study (Aning & Pokoo,
2014; Sabatier & Weible, 2014).
The PFT, on the other hand, provided a framework of interrelated concepts, ideas,
and principles. The framework is formulated and organized systematically to clarify the
political implications of critical aspects of governance, such as the promotion of civic
engagement to prevent “unanticipated or unintended consequences of previous policy
designs” (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 124). PFT also facilitates deliberations by subject
matter experts and practitioners that enhance the synchronization of alternative options
with imperatives of governance to engender political support for implementation (Mettler
& Soss, 2014; Sabatier & Weible, 2014).
Managing organizational change comes with many challenges. Therefore, I
applied the concept of transparency in policy engagement and feedback afforded by PFT
and PET to get security managers to participate in the study (Sabatier & Weible, 2014).
The application of PFT may have a positive impact on the development of broader policy
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that will not only be acceptable to all members of the regional community but will also
resonate with political actors and leaders of member states (Moynihan, & Soss, 2014;
Sabatier & Weible, 2014).
Literature Review Related to Key Variables and/or Concepts
Colonially Induced Identity Conflicts in West Africa
The role of colonialism in shaping the sociopolitical mosaic of West Africa is
epitomized by the turbulence that has bedeviled the region since the period of the
struggles for independence (Aghemelo & Ibhasebhor, 2006; Davidson, 2014). From its
“fuzzy and illogical geographical definition” (Davidson, 2014. P. 6), arbitrary border redemarcations, through repressive colonial and neocolonial regimes by European imperial
powers, the region was primed for a long journey of political instability, civil wars, and a
weak economy and national institutional structures (Davidson, 2014, p. 6; Harbeson,
2017). Although ECOWAS’ roles in containing many of these tumultuous situations are
recorded, the rippling effects and the follow-on activities of colonial interventionism in
the region continue to hinder the organization's efforts.
Upsurge in self-determination and secessionist agitations.
Since the decolonization of sub-Saharan countries began in the 1950s, issues
regarding self-determination have kept popping-up across the West African region
(Whelan, 1992). The struggles for separate states by many groups signify dissatisfaction.
In many instances, it results in the people’s rejection of the national and international
boundary arrangements bequeathed to the region by the colonial enterprise (Small, 2017;
Bannon and Collier, 2003). Apart from separatist agitations and identity conflicts,
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xenophobic tendencies, especially nomadic herder-farmer conflicts, have increased
monumentally in the region due to its arbitrary partitioning and colonization (Adams &
van de Vijver, 2017; Kyereko, 2018).
Achankeng (2013) posits that African conflicts are not mainly problems of
governance or institutional failures. And that, the conflicts are, in many cases, rooted in
colonial factors. Achankeng (2013) also finds powerful countries and global and regional
organizations complicit in perpetuating the mistakes of European imperialism on the
continent (p. 34). Achankeng (2013) also blames the untidy decolonization and
independence granting arrangements by the colonial powers that set the stage for many
conflicts in the region. He cited the French and British Trusteeships merger in Cameroon
as an example of how European imperialism fueled conflicts in Africa (p. 14).
Colonialism, therefore, left fundamental problems of secessionism and identity in its
trails. These externally imposed legacies have made it very difficult to resolve conflicts in
West Africa without delving back into the nuances of the region's historical, sociocultural, and geopolitical antecedents (Google Arts and Culture, 2014; Harbeson, 2017;
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012).
In assessing major secessionist movements in post-colonial Africa, Bereketeab
(2014) points out serious inconsistencies. He especially cites the application of
international law by the UN and the African Union to deal with self-determination issues.
Bereketeab (2014) also examines Africa's major post-colonial separatist agitations. He
highlights how the regional organizations' inconsistencies and inadequacies in managing
them have rather complicated matters and also contributed to their escalation. Bereketeab
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(2014), citing Trzcinski (2004) and Tuttle (2004); defined secessionism as "political
withdrawal from an established state ... and includes territorial disintegration through
severance of part of an existing state territory" (p. 7). The consent and recognition of the
international community are, however, key to a successful secession. The successes of
Eritrea and South Sudan and unsuccessful ones in the cases of Somaliland and
Ambazonia in Western Cameroon epitomize this phenomenon (Oduah, 2017; Searcey,
2018). The roles played by global and international organizations like the UN, the
OAU/AU, and ECOWAS in the scheme of things, therefore, make them intricately part
of a problems-solutions duality conundrum of separatist conflicts in the region
(Bereketeab, 2014; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012; Oduntan, 2015).
Rise in farmer-herder conflict.
Olaniyan, Francis, and Okeke-Uzodike (2015), while examining management
strategies of farmer-herder conflict in West Africa, argue that various governments have
resorted to the expulsion of the herders since they were considered as non-indigenes in
the country. That typifies the experience of the Fulani nomadic race in West Africa. The
Fulani people live in every state across the West African subregion and maintain strong
cultural bonds and ethnic connections, which cut across national boundaries (Gordon,
2000). The Fulani preserved their unique cultural identity regardless of their location. The
zealous preservation of cultural identity coupled with their nomadic lives as pastoralists
have made the Fulani people to be associated with being 'foreign,' regardless of the length
of time they spent in many countries in West and Central Africa (Bukari, & Schareika,
2015; Mbah, 2017). Cattle are an essential part of the life of Fulani people, even those
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who have taken to other professions still keep cattle (Mbah, 2017). Fulani came up as
migrants who arrive in the country at specific periods for grazing and leave when
conditions become better elsewhere. The Fulani herders mostly see themselves as moving
through the land; hence, even those born in a particular country considered their stay as
transitionary and hardly regarded themselves as citizens (Kyereko, 2018).
Even though farmer-pastoralist conflicts had existed long before partitioning and
colonization of West Africa, there were no citizenship problems for the Fulani. They
were just required to pay tribute to the chiefs or overlords of the state or territory to move
through or settle with their flock (Adebayo, 1995; Tonah, 2005). Even though the region
had been partitioned during the colonial era, there was no full realization of statehood
among the states as administrative control of the colonies was in the hands of the
Europeans which in many cases, they exercised indirectly through the existing local
chiefs and emirs (Hill, 2009). Issues that did not present a direct existential threat to their
dominion such movement of the Fulani pastoralists were not an issue for them (Para 15).
Maiangwa (2017) captures the post-colonial conflicts as manifestations of identity
issues in the form of ethnic mobilization, cultural "othering", and internal oppression of
people simply seen as being "different" (p. 282). According to Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni,
as referenced by Maiangwa (2017), there was energy spillover toward internecine wars
between many tribes and socio-political groups. The wars "contrived from perceived or
real cultural differences that emerged with deleterious consequences for nation-building
projects in several African countries" (p. 282). In Maiangwa's (2017) view, even though
socio-economic, political, and environmental factors have reinforced the farmer-herder
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conflicts in West Africa, it was the partitioning of Africa into colonial territories that has
made it a difficult challenge to addressing the problem. Also, because of centuries of
well-established cultural pattern of sedentary farming and unhindered and free-flowing
nomadic lifestyle of pastoral herdsmen across the region, the imposed geographical
boundaries have become more disruptive and deepened identity and otherness tensions
between the two groups (Blench, 2012; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012).
It is noteworthy that the spirit of self-determination and a sense of statehood
gathered momentum for decolonization in the 1950s and 60s. The movement kindled the
enthusiasm on issues of identity, irredentism, and otherness among West African
countries (Moritz, 2010; Tonah, 2002; 2006). This situation has negatively affected the
pastoral Fulani herders who have traversed the region for centuries. However, it is not
only the Fulani herders who have been objects of the discriminatory practices, but
migratory groups of traders and artisanal greener pasture seekers have also suffered mass
deportation because they are either considered not to belong or not citizens enough. For
instance, referencing Akrasil, (2012) and Ibrahim (2012), Olaniyan, Francis, and OkekeUzodike, (2015) indicate how the post-colonial governments in Nigeria and Ghana,
expelled pastoral herdsmen from their Plateau State and Brong Ahafo Region
respectively following clashes with plant farmers. Senegal similarly deported the
herdsmen out of the country.
OAU/AU and ECOWAS’ dilemma of maintaining colonial borders.
The OAU/AU and subsequently ECOWAS have both encountered the dilemma of
either maintaining or reversing the inherited colonial borders in West Africa. Soon after
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the formation of OAU, the issues of removing colonial borders had generated serious
arguments among the various contrasting ideological groups (the Brazzaville,
Casablanca, and Monrovia Groups) before the Cairo Resolution was eventually passed
(Zoppi, 2013). The OAU passed the 1964 Cairo Resolution that declared that "the borders
of African States, on the day of their independence, constituted a tangible reality" and
that "all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their
achievement of national independence" (Organization of African Unity Secretariat,
1964).
Notwithstanding the Cairo declaration, the OAU was still not consistent with the
issues of inherited colonial frontiers since the organization itself metamorphosed from a
pan-African movement that championed the removal of all vestiges of colonialism from
the continent (Murray, 2004; Zoppi, 2013). The OAU did not evenly manage selfdetermination disputes and irredentist movements across the continent. For example, the
OAU overlooked the Pan-Somali activism for a separate homeland for all Somalis in the
Horn of Africa (Gunn, 2017). Conversely, in 1982, 26 OAU member States recognized
the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and subsequently admitted to the
organization's Council of Ministers. Later in 1984, the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Frente POLISARIO) was seated at the OAU summit.
Subsequently, Morocco withdrew its OAU membership in protest until its readmission in
2017 (United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996).
Small (2014) explores how President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana vigorously
pursued an "unintended legacy" that has shaped Africa in a paradoxical circumstance of

37
retention of colonial frontier arrangements in the face of the struggle against imperialism
and yearn for the right to self-determination across the continent (pp. 69-74). Small
(2014) further points out that the concept of self-determination for African countries
during the early independence era had the potential to upset the decolonization roadmap.
He adds that Nkrumah astutely got the OAU to adopt the Cairo Resolution after setting
precedents in his country and the Congo by nipping in the bud, tribal and religiously
based political activism through the parliament and then getting the UN to prevent the
Katanga secession (p. 73). Thus, while Nkrumah was struggling to keep the Katanga
region as part of the Congo in the name of continental unity, he conversely engaged in a
vigorous separatist scheme to decouple the then British Togoland Trust Territory for
independent Ghana (Austin, 1963; Kah, 2016; Monfils, 1977).
Small (2014) further indicates how some African leaders declared the Congo
crisis as a watershed in African history with the propensity for spreading and eventually
undermining the OAU's agenda for continental reunification (p. 69). The leaders referred
to the burning issues of separatism in Congo's (now Democratic Republic of Congo)
Katanga and Kasai regions at the United Nations General Assembly. They got OAU's
endorsement to block the secession (p. 69). There were many African leaders of the time,
like Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, who strongly advocated for the OAU's adoption of
Resolution AHG/Res.16 (I) in 1964 (Cairo Resolution) that declared the colonially
inherited borders inviolable. This Resolution got reaffirmed as Article 4 (b) in para 3.3 of
the AU Constitutive Act.
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Considered Africa's doctrine of uti possidetis juris, West African countries have
consistently applied the Cairo Resolution in settling the land and maritime border
disputes from regional to global adjudicatory bodies. Landmark cases of land and
maritime border dispute settlements include the International Court of Justice judgment
of 2013 on the Burkina Faso-Niger land border dispute and the International Court of
Justice Reports of Judgments of 1998 on the Nigeria-Cameroun land and maritime border
dispute. Others include the International Court of Justice Judgments of 1986 on the
Burkina Faso - Republic of Mali Frontier Dispute, the 1991 Maritime Delimitation
dispute between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, and the 2017 International Tribunal for the
law of the Sea judgment on Ghana- La Côte d'Ivoire maritime border dispute (Bekker and
van de Poll, 2017; International Court of Justice, 2018).
The AU and ECOWAS adoption of the Uti possidetis doctrine in settling border
and secession cases notwithstanding, losing parties to these disputes have hardly acceded
to these judgments which they consider not based on their disparate heritage as a people
but grounded on colonial imperatives (Heerten, 2017; Morgan, 2014). For instance,
Heerten & Moses (2014) highlights the Nigeria-Biafra secessionist war as a pivotal
period for yearning and struggling for self-determination by various groups who claim
ethnic affiliations in the post-colonial history of West Africa (pp. 169-170). Heerten &
Moses (2014) also imputes the crime of genocide against the people of Biafra. The blame
is placed squarely on colonialism for bringing people with diverse cultures and mores
together as a nation. The international community is culpable for its failure to hold the
Federal Government of Nigeria in check and subsequently accountable for excesses
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during the war, invoking the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs (p.175;
Muyangwa & Vogt, 2000).
Indeed, there are many conflict hotspots in West Africa, where a couple of
separatist groups continue to challenge the new Uti possidetis status quo (Whelan, 1992).
The separatist groups in the region include a Tuareg ultranationalist - National Movement
for the Salvation of Azawad of Northern Mali, the Ambazonia separatist of Cameroun,
the Movement of Democratic Forces for Casamance (MFDC) of Senegal and the
Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) in Nigeria
(Al Jazeera and News Agencies, 2018; Bax, 2017; Bereketeab, 2014; Lewis, 2012). The
imposition of colonial boundaries by imperial Europe, reinforced by the adoption of
Cairo Resolution by the ECOWAS, remain among the difficulties that hamper a lasting
solution to many conflicts in the region (Oduntan, 2015; Vines, 2013). Also noteworthy
is the existence of internecine conflicts in pre-colonial West Africa, yet, it was the
region's partitioning and subsequent colonization that intensified and prolonged the
conflicts. The long period of colonization also set the region up for continued exploitation
of its resources for the development of metropolitan Europe (Afisi, 2009; Annan, 2014).
Various works of literature discussed have deliberated on several aspects of the
problem and ECOWAS’ roles in regional conflict management. That notwithstanding, the
writers fell short of delving into detailing the two-pronged nature of the problem and how
their interconnectedness affects the efficacy of the various intervention measures
implemented by ECOWAS. Although, writings on significant influences of the vestiges
of colonialism on the region's conflict dynamics have helped in understanding the roots
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of the conflicts in the region, how existing threats combine with the new and emerging
ones to complicate matters have not been considered. This study delves into the problem
with a bifocal standpoint to ensure a more nuanced evaluation of the problem.
The Cold War and Peace and Security in West Africa
At independence, countries in West Africa were contending with the effects of
twin external phenomena of neo-colonialism and the Cold War. There are no records of
armed kinetic exchanges in the West African region directly attributable to the Cold War
superpower wrangling during the period. However, the relationship between countries in
the region and their internal political systems was, to no small extent, defined by the
phenomenon (Spies, 2018; Hetch, 2011; Harris, 2017). For example, during the Biafra
War, countries from both the West (United Kingdom) and the East (Soviet Union) took
turns to provide materiel support to the Federal Government side thereby contributing to
the high levels of casualties recorded (Heerten & Moses, 2014; Ugochukwu, 2010;). The
Cold War that began just after the Second World War led by two great allied powers –
the United States and the Soviet Union also operated in symbiosis with countries that
have neo-colonial and hegemonic interest to complicate the security situation in West
Africa (Pateman, 2003; Lewis, 1967). The fragility of newly independent states in West
Africa made them vulnerable to the cataclysmic tentacles of the Cold War East-West
divide (de Sousa, 2016; Olympio, 1961).
Regionally, the East-West ideological blocs were replicated in West Africa in
general, precipitating the formation of two prominent groups known as the Casablanca
Group and the Monrovia Group. The Casablanca bloc was led by Kwame Nkrumah
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(Ghana) with Sékou Touré (Guinea), and Modibo Keita (Mali) as other West African
members with King Mohammed V (Morocco) as the North African member. The
Casablanca group was Eastern and socialist-oriented with the Pan-Africanist agenda. The
Monrovia bloc, on the other hand, included West African countries like Nigeria, Sierra
Leone, Liberia, Togo, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Senegal, Dahomey (Benin Republic),
Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), and Niger. Unlike the Casablanca bloc, the Monrovia bloc
was a pro-Western nationalist group that advocated a gradualist approach to the
continental union. The two opposing blocs eventually came together in conjunction with
other continental interest groups like the Brazzaville Group, an association of former
French colonies to found the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 (Hetch, 2011;
Genge, Kornegay, & Rule, 2010).
The East-West ideological rivalry of the Cold War-era trickled down to the
domain of national political divides of many countries in West Africa. Both blocs were
guilty of going as far as supporting one-party regimes as epitomized by the
administrations of Presidents Nkrumah of Ghana and Félix Houphouët- Boigny of Côte
d'Ivoire by the East and West respectively. Those alliances came on as the critical
destabilizing factor in the region's security and governance system (Amanor-Lartey,
2015; Aning, & Bah, 2009; Campbell, 2011; Dumbuya, 2008).
In Ghana, for instance, while President Nkrumah was known to have his
ideological leaning towards the former United Socialist Soviet Russia led Eastern bloc,
the main opposition political party of the country claimed allegiance to the US-led
Capitalist West. The bitter rivalry between the Nkrumah administration and the
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opposition group, the subsequent overthrow of the government, and the eventual
handover of power to the pro-Western opposition political party pointed to a possible
scheme in which the United States was complicit (Mwakikagile, 2015; Pateman, 2003).
Also, during the Nigerian Civil War, President de Gaulle of France is cited for having
alongside the apartheid South Africa to have assisted the Biafra side while the Soviet
Union, Egypt, and Algeria supported the Federal troops (Pateman, 2003; Stent, 1973).
While referencing Komer Report (1965), Mwakikagile (2015) indicated that
Robert W. Komer, a US National Security Council staffer advised his bosses as follows:
"we may have a pro-Western coup in Ghana soon. Certain key military and police figures
have been planning one for some time, and Ghana's deteriorating economic condition
may provide the spark" (p. 109; Lee, 2001). Mwakikagile (2015) minced no word in
blaming the Nkrumah overthrow squarely on the US government as the allegations that it
"created or exacerbated the conditions that favored a coup and did so for the express
purpose for bringing one about" (109).
Additionally, Nwakikagile (2015) considered the American Central Intelligence
Agency's (CIA) intricate contribution to the violent coup to ouster Nkrumah as an
epitome of the Western governments and intelligence agencies collaboration during the
Cold War in perpetuating "the most tragic events in the history of post-colonial Africa"
(p. 118). Nwakikagile (2015), however, concedes that domestic some existing socioeconomic factors galvanized local resistance that spurred the coup leaders into action but
with the West's covert facilitation and support. Also linked, was, the security and
intelligence support the United States provided the capitalist-oriented opposition leader,
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Dr. K.A. Busia. Dr. Busia was appointed the Chairman of the National Advisory
Committee by the military regime that toppled the Nkrumah administration and got
subsequently elected the prime minister of Ghana in an election supervised by the same
military government (p. 176-179).
On the other hand, in de Sousa (2016), the author recounts Cuba and Soviet
Union's involvement in African Marxist movements with political and military support
during the Cold War era to counterbalance Western dominance in the region. Many
African decolonization movements exploited the Cold War to advance their causes, and
the Soviet-led Eastern bloc offered a veritable alternative. For many such movements, it
was not necessarily about their quest for the Marxist ideology. It was more about the
diplomatic leverage, financial assistance, and the military support they could gain from
the Eastern bloc to enable them to break away from the yoke of colonialism and also to
withstand the overhanging menace of neo-colonialism (Scarnecchia, 2018). Therefore,
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many African countries switched toward the
West for democratic governance, capital investment, and technological support. (Bassist,
2018; Cascais, 2017)
Scarnecchia (2018) explores the interplay of global, regional, and national
interests of the Cold War era on the African continent. The author gives a bifocal
assessment of the complex Cold War relationships from "the perspectives of both the
Cold War powers and that of Africans" (pp. 383-390). Scarnecchia also delved into the
turf war that characterized the era among the various competing interests and interactions
from the independence struggles through the post-independence neocolonial phases.
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While referencing Lee (2010) and Byrne (2013), Scarnecchia (2018) indicated a
successful attempt at creating a third ideological bloc that aligned to neither of the Cold
War divides (East and West). The leaders of the new bloc were "Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru of India, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, President Sukarno of
Indonesia, and Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana" (p. 384). This move by these
influential third world leaders was not taken lightly by the Cold War powers. Both the
Soviet Union and the United States especially saw their interest in the region threatened
by the Non-Aligned Movement. For instance, Scarnecchia (2018), argued about how the
East-West Cold War rivalry impacted on security in Africa that, "the Americans were
always in the driver's seat, while the Soviets watched from the sidelines as events in the
Congo unfolded according to the US scenario" (as cited in Mazov, 2010, p. 177).
Indeed, Watts et al. (2018) have asserted that "in attempting to ensure that
partners in Africa remained aligned with the United States rather than the Soviets, the
United States might well have aggravated domestic political tensions and ultimately
increased the incidence of civil wars on the continent" (p. 83). Marc et al. (2015)
particularly pointed to the United Kingdom and France as critical players in post-Cold
War conflicts in West Africa (as cited in N'Diaye, 2011). France's refusal to gracefully
accept Guinea's (Conakry) quest to staying out of its (France's post-colonial) community
epitomized the kind of neo-colonial machinations the former colonial master had hatched.
Guinea's fractious decolonization process led to France imposing economic blockade and
political isolation of Guinea (Du Bois, 1963; Marc et al., 2015).
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There is no gainsaying that the various African leaders and political elites
exploited the fog of the Cold War to advance their quest for continental decolonization.
However, their achievements came at a very high price because, while they focused on
attaining independence, the superpowers had a longer-term neo-colonization plan. They
used their economic influence, global political clout, and superior intelligence network
and military power as leverage to pursue their objectives (Marc et al., 2015; Nkrumah,
1965). Marc et al. (2015) argue that the superpowers encouraged and in some instances,
established puppet regimes in the region which were left weakened and exposed to
threats of rebellion when they became irrelevant in the post-Cold War period (as cited in
Luckham, 1982; N'Diaye, 2011). Marc et al. (2015) sum it up as follows:
Support to states with very strong ties to the former colonial power—such as
Houphouët-Boigny's Côte d'Ivoire, Samuel Doe's Liberia, and Gnassingbé
Eyadéma's Togo, gave authoritarian leaders carte blanche to exercise repressive
means of control. The end of the Cold War triggered the collapse of central
authority in many West African countries, either directly or indirectly. As
unconditional backing ended overnight, the supply of arms, military assistance
programs, funding, and other interventions dried up (p.10).
Certainly, the Cold War has contributed immensely to the deterioration of the
security situation in West Africa in diverse ways. A region bursting with postindependence freedom got entrapped in the labyrinth of the Cold War complexities that
have left its security systems precariously off-balanced (Harris, 2017; Hetch, 2011; Spies,
2018). Even though a couple of writers and subject matter experts have sought to expose
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the impact of the phenomenon in the region, they have come shy of proffering how to
manage it within the context of the ECOWAS security architecture. Conversely, the Cold
War undercurrents in the regional threat mix have not had adequate consideration in
ECOWAS’ existing security framework.
The Effects of the Post-September 11 Wars on Terror on Peace and Security in
West Africa
The declaration of the Post-September 11 War on Terror by US President G.W.
Bush Jr. represented another era in the history of West Africa when the region again
became a prey to global powers' dictates. President Bush did not mince words when he
proclaimed what became popularly known as the "Bush Doctrine" in the aftermath of the
terror attacks. In his speech after the attacks, President Bush cited Niger, a West African
country as a source of significant quantities of uranium for Saddam Hussein's alleged
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) (Dockrill, 2006; Jervis, 2003). According to
Dockrill (2006), the African uranium connection was attributed to Britain's intelligence
dossier by then-Secretary of State Colin Powell at the UN Security Council and
subsequently by President Bush in his 2003 State of the Union Address. The allegation
was, however, discredited by the International Atomic Agency (IAA) to the UN (as cited
in Frankel 2003, A15).
The IAA rebuff notwithstanding, the West African region did not escape
becoming another operational theatre for prosecuting the "Bush Doctrine" of the Global
War on Terrorism (GWOT). Since the region was tagged and there was no-turning-back
on already prepared grand strategic plans. Browne (2018) cited the commander of US
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special operations in Africa, Major General Marcus Hicks, as saying that, "ISIS and al
Qaeda represent major threats and are growing in strength in West Africa" (Para 1).
Incidentally, this statement was made in Niger during EXERCISE FLINTLOCK 18, joint
military counterterrorism operations involving troops from Africa and western countries
(Para 2).
In Akanji (2019), the author analyses ECOWAS’ terrorism experience within the
context of the post-September 11, mainly Western collaboration with different
governments in the region in combating the menace. Akanji (2019) also examines the
strategies employed and the responses of the various actors with a focus on ECOWAS’
challenges, especially in most affected countries - Nigeria and Mali. He delved into the
various ECOWAS initiatives toward conflict management and the regional body's
collaborative efforts with both regional and international state and non-state actors in
combatting terrorism (p. 101).
According to Akanji (2019), some ECOWAS member states refused to cooperate
with it in conducting security operations. He also indicates that, member states’ failure to
honor their financial obligations impacts on effective functioning of the organization's
security management system. Externally, Akanji attributes ECOWAS’ primary challenge
to the overbearing influence of the African Union and the United Nations on regional and
subregional initiatives. The main problem is primarily on decisions on the use of force;
thus, foreclosing unilateral but timely and critical military interventions (p. 106).
However, Akanji's attention was on ECOWAS’ internal and external challenges in
dealing with the problem. Akanji also examines the ECOWAS counterterrorism
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strategies but within the context of the organization's existing protocols, treaties and
agreements thereby limiting the scope of the study and consequently, overlooking the
interrelationships with other threats to the region's security
Zimmerer (2019) also tracks the metamorphosis of the conflict in the Sahel
region of West Africa from the launch of the Post-September 11 War on Terror to the
period when it became a full-blown terror dominated crisis. Zimmerer described the
effects of the response from West African security forces, the UN, and the French to the
conflict as "little discernible progress" with the threat rather growing and becoming more
complex (p. 1). Zimmerer assesses the relationships among the terrorist groups in the
region, their intentions and capabilities, external links to Al Qaeda, and the motivations
for their eventual merger to form a new group called Jama' at Nusrat al-Islam wal
Muslimin (JNIM). However, because it is also terrorism focused, the study failed to
appreciate the pre-September 11 security dynamics and, consequently, missed the
existing conflict undercurrents that have inhibiting/aggravating significances for a
triangulated analysis of the problem. Thus, apart from the intent and capabilities, the
inhibiting/aggravating circumstances would have constituted a third factor in the report if
the study was not skewed toward terrorism.
Goerzig (2019) contextualizes the research on Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) terrorist group's learning into meso and macro levels influencing factors from
tactical and strategic perspectives. Goerzig described the "meso-level influences concept
as cooperation and ultimate merging with Al Qaeda, and macro-level influences as
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government action" (p. 1). With this, Goerzig posits that the concept of "counterterrorism
often does not lead to what was intended and instead aggravates problems" (p. 1).
In justifying this stand, the author made references to previous counterterrorism
studies that failed to pose questions on the construct and instead, adopting it, thereby not
only failing to lead to the intended objectives but also aggravating the problems (p. 1).
Goerzig argues that violence and radicalization may not necessarily be characterized by
terrorism, especially in the Islamic Maghreb. She explains that terrorist learning could
also lead to moderation in their attitude and that, "the sustainable answer to the question
of the political implication of this is not how to boost counterterrorism measures but how
to redefine them." (p. 2). While referencing Ranstorp & Normak (2015) and Rasmussen
and Hafez (2010), Georzig expatiates on terrorists' proclivity to non-escalatory
innovation when the appropriate conditioning factors are put in place. (p. 3).
Several studies have been conducted on the effects of the United States'
declaration of the (GWOT) on peace and security in West Africa. That notwithstanding,
the various researchers have, in many cases, focused on terrorism and its associated
factors or made cursory references to other aspects of the region's peace and security
dynamics. Each has an area of concentration within its peculiar terrorism and
counterterrorism narratives in all the literature referenced in this chapter.
ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture
The initial ECOWAS treaty of May 1975 made no provision for military
intervention in interstate and intrastate conflicts among member states. However,
realizing the need for regional peace and security, the organization entered into various
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protocols and agreements to deal with problems of insecurity. These include the June
1977 Agreement on Non-Aggression and Assistance in Defence (ANAD), the April 1978
Non-Aggression Protocol, and a Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence signed in
Freetown on May 29, 1981 (Agbu, 2006; ECOWAS, 1999; United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa 2018). These agreements and protocols provided the impetus for
the initial military intervention operations carried out by the organization in Liberia and
subsequently, in Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire, and the Gambia (Agbu,
2006; ECOWAS, 2015c).
Following ECOWAS’ involvement in peace and security matters, it became
necessary for the organization to structuralize. The structuralization did not only enable
ECOWAS to leverage its peacekeeping and peace enforcement capacities, but it also
enhanced its mandate implementation capabilities and operational reach in responding to
increasing demands from the international community and civil society for
democratization (Aning, & Bah, 2009; Francis, 2009). Based on its successes and lessons
learned, ECOWAS decided to move on from its state of an ad-hoc and apparent reactive
approach to quelling conflict to a more structured approach to managing regional peace
and security (Aning, & Bah, 2009; Francis, 2009).
Consequently, in 1993, as the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone intensified,
ECOWAS revised its treaty by introducing Article 58 for the establishment of regional
peace, stability, and security system. The call was for all community members to actively
participate in the region's peace and security matters to ensure "timely prevention and
resolution of intra-state and inter-state conflicts" (ECOWAS, 1993, Art 58). ECOWAS
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then signed a Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management,
and Resolution; Peace-keeping; and Security in 1999 to empower the organization "to
control the flow of small arms and light weapons." (ECOWAS, 1999, Arts. 50 and 51;
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2016).
Core to the ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture is the concept of the Early
Warning System, also known as the ECOWARN. To give effect to the 1999 ECOWAS
Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security Chapters IV and V of the protocol made
provisions for an early warning system. While Chapter IV covered the establishment of a
headquarters based Observation and Monitoring Centre and subregional Observation and
Monitoring Zones, Chapter V defined the conditions for application, the authority to
initiate action, and the procedures for implementing the mechanism (ECOWAS, 1999,
Arts. 23-27). The Early Warning mechanism was established to augment member states'
alert systems to enable affected countries to identify and provide an initial response to the
crisis proactively and to also disseminate information swiftly among other member states
ahead of subregional intervention (IOM, 2016; Wulf & Debiel, 2009; Bashir, 2015).
ECOWARN, per the 1999 Protocol, established two operational branches that comprised
an Observation and Monitoring Centre in Abuja, Nigeria, and four-zone offices across the
subregion.
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The zones are as follows: Zone I - Cape Verde, Senegal the Gambia, GuineaBissau, and The Gambia with headquarters in Banjul. Zone II - Burkina Faso, Côte
d'Ivoire, Mali, and Niger, with the office in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Zone III Ghana, Guinea Conakry, Liberia, and Sierra Leone has its office in Monrovia, Liberia.
Zone IV - Benin, Nigeria, and Togo with the headquarters in Cotonou, Benin (Bashir,
2015; Odobo et al., 2017; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
2018). The zonal various observatory groupings and the headquarters-based Monitoring
Center for the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network are shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3
Map showing ECOWAS zones for Early Warning and Response Network.

Note. Adapted from “The ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network,”
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Retrieved from
http://www.oecd.org/swac/theecowasearlywarningandresponsenetwork.htm
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The ECOWARN concept looks good on paper and has indeed made a significant
impact by sounding early alerts of a potential crisis in the subregion like that of Guinea,
Guinea Bissau, and Cote D'Ivoire (Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development 2018; Bashir, 2015; ECOWAS, 2017). However, the anticipated end-state
for the establishment of ECOWARN as captured in the 1999 ECOWAS Protocol was as
follows: "a subregional peace and security observation system that will prevent conflict
under Article 58 of the Revised Treaty" is fraught with challenges (ECOWAS bb 1999,
Chapter IV, para 1; Odobo et al., 2017; USAID, 2019). The United States government
has come up with a program for Reacting to Early Warning and Response Data in West
Africa (REWARD) as part of its Early Warning and Response Partnership (EWARP)
initiative to support ECOWAS (ECOWAS, 2018; USAID, 2019). However, the United
States' support is in conflict data analysis with a focus on electoral violence in selected
countries (Niger, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Mali, and Togo) in the region (USAID, 2019).
Also significant in ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture was the adoption
of a Code of Conduct to backstop the implementation of the Moratorium on the
Importation, Exportation, and Manufacture of Light Weapons that was declared in
October 1998 in Abuja, Nigeria. The Moratorium aimed to "facilitate the resolution of
violent conflict, enhance peacebuilding measures, step-up arms control, and curb the
proliferation of light weapons" in the region (ECOWAS 1999; UN, 1999; United Nations
Economic Commission for Africa, 2016, para 2). ECOWAS established the Program for
Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) to give effect and
serve as an enforcement mechanism for the implementation of the Moratorium. The
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PCASED defined the Code of Conduct and a Plan of Action covering nine thematic areas
(Ayissi & Sall, 2005).
From November 30 to December 1, 2000, "the ministers of OAU member states
met in Bamako, Mali, to develop an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation,
Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons" (African Union Peace
and Security, 2012; Organization of African Unity, 2000, para 1). This initiative was in
line with ECOWAS’ acquiescence to other international treaties, protocols, and
agreements signed by its member states as part of the continental and global
organizations. For example, the 2000 Bamako Declaration was adopted as a common
position for ECOWAS and AU under the United Nations Programme of Action to
Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All
Its Aspects (POA) (Alusala, 2017; Olvera, 2013; United Nations Office for Disarmament
Affairs; 2016).
Following recommendations of the 2002 evaluation report of a study conducted
by independent experts on the 1998 ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation,
Exportation, and Manufacture of Light Weapons, the regional group in June 2006
adopted the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their
Ammunition and Other Related Materials (Berkol, 2007, p. 1; ECOWAS, 2006). This
convention aimed to make the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation, and
Manufacture of Light Weapons a legally binding instrument since there many cases of
non-compliance by member states due to the voluntary nature of the Moratorium (Berkol,
2007, p. 1; Coulibaly, 2007, p. 4).
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There is no gainsaying about the numerous achievements that have emanated
from the various agreements, treaties, protocols, and memoranda of understanding
(Lucey, 2016; Ayissi & Sall, 2005). That notwithstanding, while some of these security
arrangements have remained mere paper works many of them have only been partially
implemented (Bolarinwa, 2015 Coulibaly, 2007; Okunade & Ogunnubi, 2018, pp 2-6).
Understandably, there are abundant literature and ECOWAS documents on frameworks
and agreements on how the security threats in the West African region could be managed.
However, a perspective on the two-pronged approach to managing the preexisting
internecine conflicts and the new and emerging threats like terrorism, cyber, and
organized transnational criminal activities in the region is unexplored. Thus, the nexus
between the two layers have remained unaddressed while persistent conflicts and the
emergence of new security threats bedevil the region (Aning & Pokoo, 2014; Marc et al.,
2015; UN News, 2019).
Okere, (2015), for example, evaluated the ECOWAS conflict management and
peacekeeping interventions in West Africa to draw lessons for a more robust regional
peace and security system (p. 30). While he commended ECOWAS’ peacekeeping
records, he criticized the organization's failure to halt the growing violence in the region.
He cited "political will to act, political cohesion and clear mandate" as preconditions for
any successful peacekeeping endeavor (p. 30). He went further to proffer conflict
prevention as a better and cost-effective approach to conflict management (p. 43). In this
literature, Okere narrates the various peacekeeping and peace enforcement interventions
ECOWAS has undertaken and concludes that alone is not enough as a strategy and that
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the region's peace and security landscape remains fragile (p. 42). One major gap in this
literature is its focus on ECOWAS’ management of security threats posed by the postCold War domestic conflicts while overlooking the new and emerging sources of
insecurity like terrorism and violent or organized crimes across the region (Berkol, 2007;
ECOWAS, 2006, pp.6&7).
In exploring the security dynamics in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB), Tar and
Mustapha (2017) assessed the historical, economic, and geopolitical antecedents for the
formation of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and its roles in the region's
security imperatives. Characteristically, the LCBC's focus has been diverted by the threat
posed by the Boko Haram terrorist group in the area. While referencing Kagwanja
(2006), Tar and Mustapha (2017) asserted that the LCBC's war on Boko Haram
insurgents in the LCB region could be described as an extension of the US-led global war
on terror (p. 100). Tar and Mustapha lauded the efforts of the LCBC's Multinational Joint
Task Force (MNJTF). The MNJTF is a politico-military entity that has the blessing of the
African Union's Peace and Security Council to support other supranational and regional
organizations on the continent (p. 109).
Tar and Mustapha (2017) referred to Chapter Eight of the United Nations Charter
as a provision that empowers regional organizations to act to deal with security
challenges confronting them. He also highlighted the importance of local bodies' takeover of security roles to fill the gap left by the United Nations' inability to address that
deficit, (p. 100). Chapter Eight, of the United Nations Charter, specifically provides that:
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Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements
or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided
that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations (Article 52, para 1).
Tar and Mustapha identified the importance of a comprehensive security
framework as a viable option for addressing regional security issues. However, their
focus on political engagements and deployment of "more boots on the ground" left socioeconomic factors and the roles of many stakeholders like civil society groups and thinktanks out of the equation (p. 115; Alagappa, 1995). Besides, the much-eulogized MNJTF
in the literature has rather weakened the resolve of more experienced and formidable
ECOWAS in dealing with the threat. Thus, even though the formation of LCBC allowed
for better focusing, the MNJTF superfluously overlaps regional efforts, thereby allowing
the problem to fester.
Summary
This chapter began by establishing the literature search strategy and then went
straight to the primary research questions of this study. The chapter also established the
gaps in the various literature discussed. Additionally, the chapter revealed the inherent
weaknesses of the reviewed literature in dealing with the problem within a context of
relevant themes with due consideration to the primary research questions of this study.
Chapter two also emphasized the need for centralizing the two layers of threats to
peace and security ECOWAS’ analytical process. The conceptual framework
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underpinning the study was the PET and PFT. While the application of PET will create
adequate space for an in-depth analysis of the two layers of threats and integration of
divergent viewpoints, the PTF allows for the study of interrelated concepts and
synchronization of alternative options.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
In conducting this study, I sought to explore the Economic Community of West
African States’ (ECOWAS’) approach to regional security management in West Africa.
ECOWAS has undertaken both diplomatic and military strategies to address conflicts in
the region with significant success. Due to changes in global security dynamics, West
Africa is confronted with an additional layer of the threat posed by terrorism, cybercrime,
and organized transnational and cross-border crimes (Akokpari, 2016; Marc et al., 2015).
ECOWAS’ strategy of conventional military deployment and mediation had been
effective in the past (Akokpari, 2016). Yet, the regional body is astounded by rising
threat levels (Marc et al., 2015). This phenomenon could be attributable to ECOWAS’
failure to engrain the interventions in a detailed assessment of the complex interactions
between the two layers of security threats in the region (New Jersey Office of Homeland
Security and Preparedness, 2018). I applied the qualitative method to explore the threat
interconnectedness and its impacts on the region’s security.
I restate the RQs in this chapter and also justify the methodology. In addition, I
describe the recruitment procedure for the research participants and the data collection
and analysis techniques that were applied. I also discuss my role as a researcher and show
how I addressed ethical concerns and issues regarding credibility, trustworthiness, and
protection of participants.
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Research Design and Rationale
The overall question for the research was, how effective is ECOWAS’ current
approach to security management in the region? The other RQs were as follows:
RQ2. How well is ECOWAS prepared to manage new and emerging security
problems that confront the region?
RQ3. What implementation challenges does ECOWAS face in its scheme of
conflict management strategy?
This research involved a nuanced study of ECOWAS’ security threat strategy visà-vis the two layers of threats confronting the West African region. According to
Creswell (2009), although the primary research methods are qualitative, quantitative and
mixed approaches, researchers are influenced by their worldview in which one to choose.
Motivated by the constructivist worldview, I was able to draw from my varied
experiences in managing security issues at national, regional, and global levels to drive
the study (see Petersen, & Gencel, 2013). Considering the complexities and multiplicity
of the study, my constructivist worldview enhanced my understanding of the
phenomenon as the study progresses (see Adom, Yeboah, & Ankrah, 2016).
I used the qualitative approach with grounded theory. The qualitative approach
enabled me to explore the various perspectives of practitioners, subject matter experts,
and peace and security institutions across the region regarding the problem (Creswell,
2013; Yin, 2016). The study was an exploratory case study based on a formative
evaluation research methodology.
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The study began with an exploration of the prevailing security situation among
member states to establish the current threats profile and the region's vulnerabilities to
them. ECOWAS architecture and strategies for the management of its members' security
were subjected to formative evaluation to assess their inherent challenges as well as the
effectiveness and efficacy of their implementation process. This approach helps security
practitioners to harmonize the various national doctrines for conflict management
strategies to be using existing best practices. This approach enhances researchers’ ability
to proffer alternative strategies and contextualize aspects of social value (Kozleski,
2017).
Role of the Researcher
Researchers are considered as instruments, especially in qualitative studies,
because of their intricate roles in data collection, analysis, and interpretation (Chenail,
2011; Creswell, 2013; Turato, 2005). These characteristics manifest in how researchers'
backgrounds, interests, and values influence their recruitment of participants, the options
they consider, and the decisions they make at each stage in shaping the study (Creswell,
2014; Fink, 2000; Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995). Sutton and Austin (2015), citing
Strauss and Corbin, indicated that, unlike quantitative research, the qualitative approach
enables researchers to have a better appreciation of the "hows" and "whys" of the
phenomenon, particularly during in-depth interviews.
As the researcher, I had the responsibility of deciding on the data types and
sources employed in this study. I also chose the methods of analysis applied, where to lay
emphasis, and the angle of interpretation to give to the data. All these circumstances
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made me susceptible to inherent bias, which I made a concerted effort to mitigate and,
where possible, avoid altogether (see Sutton, & Austin, 2015). As a qualitative
researcher, I acknowledged my sociocultural circumstances as a citizen of West Africa
and my military, UN security, and peacekeeping backgrounds, which could potentially
shape my worldview and perspectives on the region’s security matters generally.
Throughout the research process, I strove to minimize the effects of those biases on the
credibility of the data analysis, findings, and conclusions of the study.
Methodology
Participant Selection Logic
The setting for this research was in West Africa, a diverse region with English,
French, and Portuguese as national languages among the various countries. ECOWAS is
represented proportionately by its member states regarding population size and other
internal democratic mechanisms. In qualitative research, sample size and multiple
sourcing are vital in collecting and analyzing data (Creswell, 2013; Merriam, 2009; Yin,
2016).
I selected participants from KAIPTC, the ECOWAS headquarters, the WANEP
office, and the Nigerian National Defense College (NDC) in Abuja, Nigeria. Both
KAIPTC and WANEP are known industry players in regional security in the region. I
selected participants from the two institutions to obtain their perspectives. I also recruited
participants to reflect the national languages of countries in the region. I did so by
ensuring that members from countries across the various lingua franca, regional peace,
and security institutions and think tanks were involved in the data collection process.
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A qualitative study calls for continuous refocusing and redrawing of study
parameters during fieldwork (Miles et al., 2014). Emmel (2013) also asserted that
qualitative sampling as a process will require the researcher to make a series of implied
decisions that could necessitate making adjustments along the way. In line with Shank
(2002) and Patton (2012), I applied the nonprobability sampling technique in choosing
participants for data collection. I used the purposive sampling technique to create a quota
system in recruiting members for the various aspects of the data collection.
I anticipated having at least 20% female participants to ensure a reasonably
balanced gender representation and perspectives; however, I attained 16.7%. The
participants comprised practitioners at the ECOWAS headquarters at Abuja, Nigeria,
security experts, practitioners, and think tanks from the region's peace and security
institutions in Ghana and Nigeria. The criteria ensured diversity and the triangulation of
data collected and facilitated a comprehensive analysis of the problem.
Unlike the quantitative method, which places much premium on sample size for
statistical significance, qualitative research does not emphasize the importance of a large
sample size in determining the validity and reliability of the research findings (Merriam,
2009). Marshal (1996) emphasized taking a cue from the RQs in deciding on the
appropriate size of a sample for a qualitative study (p. 523), while Yin (2016) and
Creswell (2013) asserted that the sample size must equally reflect the purpose and goal of
the study. I made provision for approximately 15 participants in all: 10 primary
participants with room for an additional five participants to contain the snowball effect. I,
however, interviewed a total of 12 participants; once I attained the data saturation point, I
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ended the interview process and shifted efforts to the collection of documents to
triangulate the process.
I conducted interviews with practitioners from the ECOWAS Commission in
Abuja, Nigeria. I used face-to-face, in-depth interviews to seek Intellectual perspectives
on the phenomenon from the KAIPTC in Accra, Ghana. Also, subject matter experts at
WANEP offices in Nigeria and Ghana were interviewed to assess the vulnerabilities of
the region within the context of the threats. The in-depth interviews also created
platforms to evaluate the perspectives of academia, practitioners, and subject matter
experts concerning the existing and new and emerging threats in the region.
Instrumentation
The choice of appropriate instruments facilitates focusing on the research
objectives and also enhances the data collection and analysis process (Trigueros, Juan, &
Sandoval, 2017). Three main data collection instruments were used in this study. These
comprised the application of interview protocol, documents, and I as the researcher. This
combination of instrumentation brought about the convergence and corroboration of data
needed to enhance triangulation and confluence of evidence (Bowen, 2009).
The interview protocol application enables the researcher to conduct an in-depth
exploratory within the context of the research purpose and questions to enhance the
quality of responses (Yin, 2016; Kvale & Brinkman, 2009). I adopted what CastilloMontoya (2016) proffered as a four-phase Interview Protocol Refinement (IPR) process:
“Phase 1: Ensuring interview questions align with research questions,
Phase 2: Constructing an inquiry-based conversation,
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Phase 3: Receiving feedback on interview protocols
Phase 4: Piloting the interview protocol.” (p.812).
I followed the four-phase IPR for both face-to-face and telephone interviews to
enhance the interview protocol's reliability and, consequently, improve the quality of the
interview data (p.811; Jacob & Furgerson, 2012; Trigueros, Juan, & Sandoval, 2017).
Document analysis will form a significant aspect of my data collection. According to
Bowen (2009), documents are interpreted to give voice and meaning to the data. Frey
(2018) adds to the importance of document analysis in arriving at answers to specific
research questions. I used the following eight-step process offered by O’Leary as cited by
Triad (2016) to guide the document analysis:
1.

Gather relevant texts.

2.

Develop an organization and management scheme.

3.

Make copies of the originals for annotation.

4.

Asses authenticity of documents.

5. Explore the document's agenda, biases.
6.

Explore background information (e.g., tone, style, purpose).

7. Ask questions about the document (e.g., who produced it? why? when? type of
data?).
8.

Explore content.

Due to the semi-structured of the study’s interview process, I, as the researcher,
also was a major instrument. Considering myself as an instrument enabled me to be
continuously conscious of my potential biases during the data collection (Pezalla,
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Pettigrew, & Miller-Day, 2012). I also recognized the central role I play in selecting
documents, respondents, venues, and the amount of time to apportion to each data
collection exercise (Xu & Storr, 2012; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Merriam, 2009; Yin,
2016).
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
I commenced participants’ recruitment for the study upon obtaining the Walden
University Institutional Research Board approval. I applied purposive sampling with a
snowballing technique for selecting participants (Maxwell, 2012; Biernack & Waldorf,
2013). I used purposive sampling to create a quota system to allocate at least 20 percent
of the participants to women to ensure diverse gender perspectives; however, I achieved
16.7 percent.
I started by recruiting my research assistants in Nigeria and Ghana, who partnered
me to coordinate the interview schedules. Interview venues were the ECOWAS
Commission in Abuja and the KAIPTC in Accra. I sent e-mails to the various institutions
for the conduct of the interviews to arrange for contact persons, as well as my preference
in the participants (male, female, and linguistic backgrounds) and possible use of
facilities. Appendix B contains the invitation letter sent to participants.
I obtained participants’ consent, discussed confidentiality issues, and followed
my interview protocols to address ethical concerns. There were no payments made to
participants. I, however, made honorarium available as a gesture to participants where it
did not contravene the participants' values or their institution's code of ethics (Kvale &
Brinkmann, 2009; Creswell, 2013).
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Data Analysis Plan
The data I collected were primarily electronically recorded interviews and
documents. Field notes and data were gathered from follow-ups on interviews and used
informal discussions to gather supplementary data to fill gaps during the analysis. I used
the NVivo qualitative software to extrapolate themes, subthemes, and sub-subthemes for
the analysis. The Nvivo software, also known as the Computer Assisted Qualitative Data
Analysis Software (CAQDAS), helped me to organize and analyze the audio files
(Creswell 2013).
Issues of Trustworthiness
Credibility
Patton (2015) describes credibility as an analog of internal validity. He explains
that, even though the construct (internal validity) may not meet the rigorous standard for
establishing causality in a qualitative approach as it does in quantitative/experimental
designs, causal analysis can generate the hypothesis (p 601). The broader latitude for
subjectivity in qualitative research tends to create a condition for dilution of the
credibility of the study. A lot then hinge on the researcher, as an overbearing instrument
to be rigorous and thorough in the conduct of fieldwork to establish the credibility of the
study (Patton, 2015, p.15). I used the nonprobability sampling method of data collection
by applying purposive sampling with a snowballing technique in a qualitative research
methodology, which I consider appropriate for enhancing the credibility of this study
(Burkholder, Cox, & Crawford, 2016).
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I also adhere to the requisite protocols laid down by Walden University
Institutional Review Board (IRB)'s approval for the study regarding participants'
evaluation, instrumentation, and data evaluation and interpretation (Yin, 2016; Kvale &
Brinkman, 2009). I further deepened the study's credibility through triangulation by
employing diverse data collection sources like in-depth interviews, field notes, and
document analysis (Creswell, 2014).
Transferability
Issues of transferability in qualitative research, according to Ravitch & Carl
(2016), deal with "how qualitative studies can apply or transferable to broader contexts
while still maintaining their context-specific richness" (p.189). They postulate that "the
primacy placed on fidelity to participants' experiences in qualitative research makes it
pertinent to note the exclusive and contextual nature of findings" (p. 189). Nonetheless,
citing Guba (1981), Ravitch & Carl (2016) maintain that the concept of transferability
and the parallel notion of external validity can be attained through the provision of
adequate information and descriptions of data to allow cross-contextualization based on
available factors (pp. 188-189). Apart from providing a detailed description of the data, I
applied the purposive sampling technique. The technique enhanced transferability by
placing the data in context (DeVault, 2017).
Dependability
Miles et al. (2014) consider dependability as "the consistency and stability of the
study over time". Dependability in qualitative study refers to the stability of the data and
is similar to the quantitative concept of reliability (Guba, 1981; Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
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In ensuring dependability, I explicitly described my role and status as a researcher, finetuned my research questions, and aligned them with the design. I also subjected the study
to peer review (Miles et al., 2014). Besides, I shared relevant portions of the data with
participants for their review and responses to ensure accuracy. I then streamlined the
interpretation and analysis for further review by subject matter experts in the industry and
institutions in Nigeria, Ghana, and the United States.
Confirmability
Confirmability seeks to establish adequate objectivity in a research environment
where the researcher's personal bias does not overshadow the respondents' experiences
and preferences (Moon et al., 2016; Ravitch, & Carl, 2016). In this study, I realized that
my background as a West African and a security scholar-practitioner at KAIPTC and in
United Nations peacekeeping could generate some issues of positionality and
philosophical perspectives and made an effort to address those (Moon et al., 2016).
Therefore, I have provided a vivid account of the various processes I applied to address
potential biases. I correctly identified those concerning my epistemological and
ontological preferences. I also established trustworthiness by subjecting the study to peer
review by experts and even through the Walden University's rigorous auditing of the
findings to ensure their consistency with data collected and aligned with the
interpretations and conclusions.
Ethical Procedures
This study explored sensitive areas concerning doctrines and strategies ECOWAS
is employing to manage security in West Africa. There was a high likelihood of ethical
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issues coming up during the research. I sought participants’ informed consent and
instituted measures to safeguard their anonymity to ensure that their job security
jeopardizes by their participation in the study. I assigned each participant a nickname and
a number to cover their tracks (Ravitch & Carl, 2016). I also instituted measures that
enabled the set-limits and confidentiality for participants to be respected and their safety
ensured by agreeing with them on a convenient time and venue that suited them for their
interviews. (Sanjari, Bahramnezhad, Fomani, Shoghi, & Cheraghi, 2014). In this case, I
provided participants adequate information regarding the project, how their input was to
be recorded and used, alerted them of their rights of withdrawal at any time from the
process, and got them to sign consent forms.
I applied the grounded theory to this study. The implication was that I was
intricately involved in every stage of the research process. I was mindful of my
prejudices as a researcher and, thus, made a conscious effort to avoid unduly bringing my
influence to bear on the study by upholding a high ethical standard throughout. I sought
for IRB clearance and guidance at the various stages research process. I also applied for
approval from the Walden University Ethics Committee to authenticate the process.
Approvals from national ethics committees of countries where I interviewed the
participants (Ghana and Nigeria) were unnecessary. To further ensure adherence to
ethical standards, I requested reviews from other researchers with varied backgrounds to
equip me with alternate viewpoints as the study progressed.
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Summary
The ECOWAS’ security management framework had been successful in
containing the threat of armed conflicts in the region until the inception of additional
threats of terrorism, cybercrime, and organized transnational and cross-border crimes in
the region (Marc et al., 2015). The regional organization's security management strategy
lacks a detailed assessment of the complex relationships between the two layers of
security threats in the region (New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness,
2018).
This chapter justifies my choice of a qualitative approach to explore the
interconnectedness of the two layers of security threat to contributing to ECOWAS’
regional security strategy. I have given details of my data sampling and collection
strategy and also indicated my justification for the selection criteria for respondents.
Furthermore, I have stated how I addressed ethical, trustworthiness, and participants'
protection issues (Creswell, 2014). In chapter 4, I explained what data were collected and
analyzed to answer the research questions.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to explore the Economic Community of West
African States’ (ECOWAS’) approach to regional security management in West Africa.
This study was necessary because of the continuous deterioration of the security situation
in West Africa; the ECOWAS security management approach remains ineffective
(Akokpari, 2016; Marc et al., 2015). I conducted interviews to elicit the perspectives of
12 participants comprising security management practitioners, subject matter experts, and
research academicians.
The research proffers an alternative security management framework for
ECOWAS in its regional security approach for West Africa. The results provided a basis
for fashioning an operational framework for a synchronized threat management
architecture that ECOWAS headquarters, in collaboration with subject matter experts and
institutions of excellence, could further expound as part of measures for addressing the
persistent security problems in the region. The study is also replicable by other regional
and continental organizations seeking to expand their security management strategies.
In this chapter, I discuss the research setting, participants' demographics, data
collection process, and data analysis. I provide evidence of trustworthiness using
credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability constructs. I then present the
interview results and findings thematically and provide a summary of the chapter at the
end.
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Setting
I researched ECOWAS headquarters and selected key security institutions in West
Africa. ECOWAS headquarters and WANEP head office have staff members across the
subregion. ECOWAS is the regional organization that manages regional security in West
Africa and is represented proportionately by its member states regarding population size
and other internal democratic mechanisms. The WANEP is a peacebuilding organization
that has national networks with over 500 member organizations across the region.
KAIPTC is a regional institution of excellence that conducts academic research on
security issues in West Africa. The Nigerian NDC is the highest echelon military training
institution and a Centre of Excellence for strategic-level training for peace support
operations in West Africa. Therefore, I collected data directly from the natural settings in
Ghana and Nigeria, where these institutions operate. This approach allowed me to focus
on making meaning from the participants’ viewpoints within their environment.
I recruited three Francophone and two Anglophone participants at the ECOWAS
headquarters to reflect the region’s sociocultural dynamics generally. The purposeful
selection was to ensure adequate representation of participants from countries across the
two dominant lingua franca in West Africa. Regional peace and security institutions and
think tanks were also engaged to provide perspectives external to ECOWAS headquarters
in the data collection process.
Demographics
I interviewed 12 participants comprising five security management practitioners
from ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria, two subject matter experts from
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WANEP headquarters in Accra, Ghana, and one at WANEP country office in Abuja,
Nigeria. I interviewed three research academicians from KAIPTC and, based on
recommendation, went further with one participant from the NDC. Interviewees
comprised 33.3% military and 66.7% civilian staff in total from the various institutions,
which, based on their backgrounds, provided diverse angles to the problem. The
participant pool also comprised 66.7% Francophones and 33.3% Anglophones across the
region. No Lusophone was available for an interview due to unavailability. The study
targeted not less than 20% of female participation. However, I achieved 16.7% female
participation.
Most of the participants (58%) had doctorates, while 33% and 8% were masters
and bachelor degree holders, respectively. I also realized that 75% of respondents had
worked for more than five years with their various institutions. Participants' depth of
knowledge, experience, and diverse gender and geopolitical backgrounds provided more
profound insight into the phenomenon. Still, they also widened the spectrum of data
analysis and nuanced interpretation of results. I assigned each participant a nickname to
ensure confidentiality. Detailed demographic characteristics of respondents are shown in
Table 2.
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Table 2
Demographic Characteristics of Respondents
Description

Frequency

Percentage

Valid percentage

Cumulative percentage

French

4

33.3

33.3

33.3

English

8

66.7

66.7

100

Portuguese

0

0

0

100

Military

4

33.3

33.3

33.3

Civilian

8

66.7

66.7

100

Lingua Franca

Professional status

Length of service with institutions
0-5 years

3

25

25

25

6-10 years

3

25

25

50

11-15 years

5

41.6

41.6

91.6

16-20 years

1

8.4

41.6

100

Bachelors

1

8.4

8.4

8.4

Masters

4

33.3

33.3

41.7

Doctorate

7

58.3

58.3

100

Female

2

16.7

16.7

16.7

Male

10

83.3

83.3

100

Academic background

Gender

76

Data Collection
I applied a stratified sampling method with purposive sampling and snowball data
collection techniques using in-depth interviews, field notes, and document analysis to
gather data for this study. Participants were stratified to get perspectives from industry
practitioners, think tanks/subject matter experts, and academia. Hence, participants were
purposefully selected among practitioners from the ECOWAS Commission in Abuja,
think tanks/subject matter experts from WANEP, and academic researchers from
KAIPTC. Upon recommendation, two more participants from the ECOWAS Commission
and an academic researcher from the NDC were also interviewed in concurrence with the
snowball technique.
I had each participant sign a consent form after explaining the purpose of the
study and intended social change. Although nine (75%) respondents instantaneously
volunteered to participate, three (25%) needed up to two days to declare their consent. I
scheduled dates and locations for the interviews with the participants and also made them
aware of their rights to opt out of the exercise at any time they wished. I retrieved each
participant’s completed consent forms before I conducted the interviews.
At the beginning of each interview, I verified each participant’s identity,
introduced myself, and restated the purpose of the research and the social change I sought
to achieve. I then thanked each of them for participating in the study and reiterated
interviewees' rights and confidentiality as contained in their completed consent form. I
also requested participants' consent to use a voice recorder for the interview with further
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confidentiality guarantees. I explained that I intended to ensure that I captured their
responses accurately for data analysis.
After agreeing to set terms, attaining consents, and establishing that respondents
were comfortable with the process, I discussed the interview protocol and research
questions with them. I alerted participants when I wanted to start recording before
commencing the interviews. Two participants objected to being recorded but agreed to
notes taking. The recorded interviews lasted between 25 and 30 minutes, while those that
declined recording were between 45 and 60 minutes. The interviews were conducted in a
relaxed atmosphere to enable participants to freely express their thoughts, provide their
expertise, and share their experiences on each question. I asked follow-on questions when
needed for clarification, eliciting further information, and getting respondents on track.
At the end of the interviews, I thanked participants and agreed to get back to them
whenever necessary.
I transcribed the interviews, printed hard copies, and filed the information
hierarchically in separate Microsoft word documents in identifiable folders. I reviewed
the transcripts for coherence and flow and then extracted themes and analyzed the
content, using the NVivo 12 transcripts. I backed-up each file on a separate pen-drive. I
then duplicated all the data on an external hard-drive as a second level back-up to ensure
the protection of the documents from possible losses and malicious software attacks. I
then locked-up the hard and electronic copies of the data in a safe that only I can access.
Additional access control protocols I used for the soft copies included passwords and
identification questions to ensure that only I can access the files.
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Although I anticipated that some data collection challenges like getting the
relevant staff for the interview, some heads of departments' failure to respond to formal
Letters of Cooperation requests for data collection substantially stalled the process. There
was a particular case in which my phone calls, getting proximate representatives to
follow-up, and even sending WhatsApp messages were unsuccessful. Nonetheless, I
received warm reception and cooperation upon traveling to the various offices to have a
face to face talks on the project with them. I also received a lot of staff who volunteered
to participate. The passion and zeal of interviewees from the ECOWAS Commission
were particularly noticeable during the data collection exercise.
Data Analysis
I used NVivo 12 software to transcribe the audio data gathered from the
interviews into text. I then did a thorough perusal of the transcripts to understand the
meaning and flow of the sentences to have a better appreciation of participants'
perspectives. I further matched each interview with my field notes and related documents
I collected. Subsequently, I integrated the entire data and conducted in-depth, line-by-line
scrutiny to ensure coherence and to help me ascertain the central themes.
An overarching question on the effectiveness of ECOWAS' current regional
security management approach inspired data collection. That was followed by two
supporting questions regarding ECOWAS' preparedness and challenges as research
questions 2 and 3, respectively. However, all three interview questions were
interconnected and mutually reinforcing in attaining the purpose of the study. The three
RQs were as follows:
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RQ1. How effective is ECOWAS’ current approach to security management in
the region?
RQ2. How well is ECOWAS prepared to manage new and emerging security
problems that confront the region?
RQ3. What implementation challenges does ECOWAS face in its current scheme
of conflict management strategy?
I conducted another level of search and synthesis of the interview and
documentary data to identify themes and subthemes in consonance with the three
research questions. I subsequently evaluated the results to establish the main themes,
subthemes, and sub-Subthemes before appropriately segregating and classifying them for
the analysis. In all, I found five main themes, 14 subthemes, and two sub-subthemes. I
identified "Coordination" as a crosscutting construct and has been sub and subsubthemed across all the main themes. I conducted intertextual triangulation of the data
(interviews, field notes, and documents) to capture the diverse perspectives. I reviewed
the data's findings and then related them to the themes and the research questions as part
of the data analysis process. A summary of the main themes, subthemes, and sub
subthemes is shown in Table 3.
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Table 3
Summary of the Main Themes and Subthemes
RQ
RQ1

Main theme

Subthemes

Theme: 1 Effectiveness

a. Successful interventions

of ECOWAS

b. Unsuccessful interventions

Sub-subthemes
Nil

c. Involvement of CSOs

RQ2

Theme 2: Integrated

a. Integrated approach

Threat Management

b. Coordination mechanisms

Theme 3: ECOWAS’

a. Force generation

Preparedness

b. Decentralization of national response

Nil

Nil

mechanism
c. Lack of supranational sanctioning
instrument
d. Coordination mechanisms
Theme 4: ECOWAS

a. ECOWAS Conflict Prevention

Peace and Security

Framework

Architecture

b. Early warning mechanisms

Nil

c. ECOWAS Standby Force
RQ3

Theme 5: Mandate

a. Nonadherence to existing agreements

Implementation

and protocols

i. Direct interference

Challenges

b. Funding

ii. Indirect interference

c. External interference
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I collated all responses to each RQ from all the 12 participants and attached their
associated field notes, related documentary support, and references; and saved them in
separate folders. I then named the envelopes as "Research Question One," "Research
Question Two," and "Research Question Three." Afterward, I scrutinized each RQ folder
to identify common phrases and key-words-in-contexts. As part of my technique for a
search for missing information, I also included “integrated threat management” as part of
follow-on questions to delve deeper into interviewees’ understanding of the security
management process.
Evidence of Trustworthiness
Credibility
I applied the purposeful stratified sampling method with a snowball data
collection technique to ensure the credibility of the data collected. The purposeful
stratified sampling method enabled me to collect data in the form of interviews that came
from key industry players in security management in West Africa. Thus, I purposefully
recruited higher caliber knowledgeable and experienced security professionals from
established institutions in the region for the interviews. In applying this criterion, I
attained the following results:
a. Seventy-five percent of respondents have worked for more than five years with
their various institutions.
b.

Fifty-eight percent of the respondents were Ph.D., 33% Masters, and 8%

Bachelor’s degree holders.
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I went further to adopted two levels of triangulation to establish confidence in the
truth of the results and to enhance my attainment of a broad understanding of the
phenomenon and comprehensive and well-developed research findings. The first level of
triangulation I used was through stratification of data sampling sources into academia,
subject matter experts, and practitioners. Therefore, I selected a key regional security
institution, each among the academia (KAIPTC and later added the NDC), subject matter
experts (WANEP), and practitioners (ECOWAS) for data collection. Secondly, I applied
a multiple-source data approach where I utilized interview data, field notes, and materials
from the various institutions and open sources.
Transferability
The study focuses on the management of security problems by a regional bloc in
Africa ECOWAS. Apart from the African Union, this study is replicable in other
subregional bodies like the Southern African Development Community (SADC),
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the East African Community
(EAC), and the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA). Consequently, I have provided detailed
background and contextual information that prompted the study and the step-by-step
procedures I followed in conducting the research. Even though the research primarily
dealt with regional security issues in West Africa, security managers worldwide can
adapt it to suit their security settings.
Confirmability
I aimed at ensuring a high degree of neutrality in the findings for this study.
Therefore, before data collection, I tabulated a checklist of researcher and interviewer
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biases that could potentially skew the findings. I used multiple data sources, open-ended
question techniques, follow-on questions, and getting participants to review the results of
their responses. I also maintained field notes that contained my reflections on each
research setting and the traits and mannerisms of respondents throughout the data
collection process.
Dependability
I began ensuring dependability by following standards set by the IRB at each
stage research process. Besides, I applied the Walden University Ethics Committee's
recommendations and audit techniques for establishing dependability in the study. I
further sought peer reviews from other researchers with a diverse academic and
institutional background to equip me with alternate perspectives to guarantee
dependability as the study progressed. I also provided a vivid description of the processes
involved in the study to enable future researchers to replicate identical studies in other
subregions or at the continental level and still yield similar results.
Results
In this chapter, I analyzed the results of 12 interviews and reviewed documents
from the data gathered. I used the NVivo software to cluster and organize the interview
data, excerpts of documentary materials, and the field notes into five themes, 14
subthemes, and two sub-subthemes. I applied a thematic analysis framework to review
the main themes and subthemes to answer an overarching question regarding ECOWAS'
effectiveness and two supporting questions relating to the organization’s preparation and
implementation challenges in its current approach to security management in the region.
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Adopting the thematic analysis framework enabled me to deal with crosscutting thematic
discussions that overlapped the research questions. While I guarantee participant's
anonymity, I also take ultimate responsibility for the analytical exercise and
interpretations expatiated in the themes and subthemes that emanated from their
(participants’) shared knowledge, experiences, and perspectives in this study.
Research Question 1
RQ1: How effective is ECOWAS’ current approach to security management in
the region? I identified a total of two main themes, and six subthemes in RQ1. Each
theme has three subthemes. Theme 1 - "effectiveness of ECOWAS" had the following
subthemes: successful interventions, unsuccessful interventions, and involvement of
CSOs. Theme 2 was "integrated threat management." Theme 2 had the following
subthemes: threat integration, the framework for threat integration, and coordination
mechanisms.
Theme 1: Effectiveness of ECOWAS. The question on the degree of
effectiveness of ECOWAS generated different responses from respondents. Perspectives
picked regarding the organization's effectiveness in security management during the
interviews centered on how successful, or unsuccessful ECOWAS interventions had
been, and the involvement of regional and subregional groups and Civil Society
Organizations (CSOs).
Successful interventions. Respondents also varied in their understanding of what
constitutes success from which to assess ECOWAS' effectiveness. While some
considered success from the end-state viewpoint, others looked at the processes.
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Participant 9's comments on the effectiveness of ECOWAS operations were from a
lifesaving perspective. He conceded that "although ECOWAS had stuttering beginning
regarding the organization's failure to secure UN assent before it intervened in Liberia,
many people would have lost their livelihoods. Also, the UN assenting to the mission
later indicates ECOWAS' proactivity." Participant 11 saw ECOWAS as very effective,
considering the frameworks and the mileage it has gained in its integrated multistakeholder approach to get things done. According to Participant 7, "ECOWAS is
among the most successful organizations in terms of its leadership in sustaining relative
regional stability." He added, "Yes, the organization might have some challenges with
terrorism and related issues; we must also appreciate the strategies, frameworks, and
plans of action ECOWAS has crafted and pushing to get them through under the
prevailing circumstances."
Participant 5 assessed ECOWAS’ effectiveness mainly from the angle of the
organization’s successes in peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and diplomatic
engagements and sustaining democracy. He expressed worry about narratives that seek to
suggest ECOWAS had not been successful. He admitted institutional challenges but also
asked the following rhetorical question: “What do you imagine the security situation
would have been in West Africa without ECOWAS?” The following comment from him
is also significant:
Pick ECOMOG, for instance, the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts,
ECOMOG did a lot of good work in these countries till the UN came in. Take
Cote D'Ivoire; I think ECOMOG was part of the force that went in earlier in
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support of the UN, and now we see Cote D'Ivoire enjoying a semblance of peace.
Also, look at the recent situation in The Gambia; ECOMOG went in timely, and
in conjunction with diplomatic engagement, President Yahya Jammeh was
compelled into exile to pave the way for the president-elect to be sworn-in.
Participant 10's position on the theme is that ECOWAS is primarily an
intergovernmental organization with the remit to coordinate and facilitate member states'
affairs. He, therefore, thought ECOWAS should be held responsible for implementation
failures. He espoused that, "Just like UN or any other Inter-Governmental Organization…
most of the things that it (ECOWAS) does, it does with either the concurrence or with the
support with member states." Participant 7 expressed a similar opinion when he said:
"Everything done at the headquarters emanates from the member states." Like Participant
10 and Participant 7, Participant 9 made the same point with the following allegory: "The
ECOWAS Commission is like a vehicle with member states as joint car owners and
drivers; they maintain the vehicle, determine where to go and at which speed."
Unsuccessful interventions. Similar to the successful intervention subtheme,
respondents pointed out that ECOWAS was not successful to some extent in its
management of regional security interventions. Several comments made in this subtheme
centered on the new and emerging threats to security in the region. These included
ECOWAS’ handling of the Boko Haram terror crisis, the terror crisis in the Sahel and
Maghreb regions of West Africa, the thriving transnational organized crime, and
cybercrime in the region.
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While explaining probable reasons for ECOWAS’ inability to manage the Boko
Haram terror crisis in the region well, Participant 10 stated that the AU came in with the
MNJTF because the crisis transcended ECOWAS boundaries into The Economic
Community of Central African States (ECCAS). Participant 9, on the other hand, stated
that: "Not only MNJTF must ECOWAS be concerned about; but also, the presence
LCBC, and G5 Sahel in the region that has bred unnecessary rivalry and completion for
preponderance among the various groups; each of which claims to be fighting terrorism."
Participant 4 was rather straightforward on the matter when she stated: "You see that
ECOWAS has not been very effective in dealing with the threats because there were
other stakeholders who have multiple interests."
Participant 6 expressed disappointment that "Despite ECOWAS' initial successes
in its application of 'carrots and stick' strategy; in other words, combining diplomacy with
the use of force, the organization is gradually losing steam." He explained that:
Take the crisis in Guinea Bissau, for example. The ECOWAS Mission in Guinea
Bissau (ECOMIB) presence in that country was to acts as a strong deterrent,
dissuading any military intervention and providing a safe and secure environment.
Although the country has not exploded, if you go to Guinea Bissau, there is chaos.
So sometimes, the success of ECOWAS in some of the member states depends on
the context.
Involvement of regional and subregional groups and CSOs. All the
interviewees acknowledged the peace and security roles played by CSOs in West Africa.
Participant 5 stated that "ECOWAS depends so much on the CSOs for expertise in
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human security. They also rely on the CSOs' ability to reach remote areas in the region
for information and sensitization programs." He placed his opinion in context with the
statement below.
I will say that there have been ups and downs in the effectiveness of the
ECOWAS security management strategy in West Africa. For instance, when we
look at ECOWAS engagement with civil society organizations, it is clear that they
provide many decisive indicators for determining the type of mission to be
launched. For example, when planning for an intervention, the question of
whether the organization should carry out political, peacekeeping, peace
enforcement missions, or any of those will be required to be addressed. These are
critical decisions, and the CSOs' inputs reflect the reality on the ground.
Participant 6 indicated that the involvement of CSOs is so vital to ECOWAS'
effective security management. Therefore, he called on ECOWAS to "increase its
engagement with the CSOs, especially from the planning stage through implementation
to monitoring and evaluation." He cited the "grassroots" roles played by CSOs in support
of ECOMOG, especially during the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars. Participant 6,
however, indicated that:
The CSOs have challenges in generating funds from the region. A substantial
component of their funding comes from other organizations outside the region,
which might have their interest and agenda they might be pushing. These can drag
ECOWAS into some sort of conflict of interest.
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Theme 2: Integrated Threat Management. The concept of integrated threat
management generated exciting discussions. Discussions on the concept came up when
the topic was introduced or when respondents were asked about the concept as part of
follow-on questions to determine interviewees’ views on ECOWAS’ application of
integrated threat management process. Integrated threat management has been defined in
this study as a comprehensive and nuanced approach to identifying and analyzing multilayered threats to regional security and timely implementation of appropriate pre-emptive
and remedial measures to address the menace. Some of the prominent issues that emerged
during discussions on this theme included further clarifications of the concept and any
clear distinction between the threat integration approach the study was advancing and
ECOWAS’ institutional integration approach. The integrated threat approach and
coordination mechanisms emerged as subthemes.
Integrated threat approach. Out of all the 12 respondents, only Participant 9
indicated familiarity with the concept of integrated threat management. During the data
collection, it was apparent that although respondents comprehended an integrated threat
approach, it was within the context of stakeholder agencies and institutions working
together in a coordinated manner. For example, Participant 11 cited a "lack of
information sharing among stakeholders and inadequate interagency interactions" as part
of the significant problems the ECOWAS commission was using integrated approach
concept to address. Participant 11 also understood the interconnected nature of the new
and emerging threats to security in the region but agreed he was not aware of a
framework where all the security threats and drivers were put together on a matrix for
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analysis. Participant 11 went further to indicate that “the threat integrated approach will
be a highly beneficial concept if adopted to complement what ECOWAS has.”
Participant 8’s initial reaction on the integrated threat approach model as a
security analysis tool for ECOWAS was
As I said, everything in ECOWAS is integrated. There is no way you can remain
in your country and say that you are analyzing if you do not know what is
happening in your neighboring countries. For example, in terms of analysis,
somebody in Burkina Faso may not be interested in what is happening in Ghana.
If you have 15 national early warning and response in each national mechanism, it
will help feed into the regional security architecture.
With further probing questions and prompts regarding the thrust of the integrated threat
approach concept, Participant 8 stated that “This integrated threat approach will fit very
well in the ECPF. I am pretty sure those responsible for the ECPF will be keen to take
your ideas on this model for inclusion. That will be great.”
Participant 5 acknowledged the importance of the concept as a useful security
management tool, said that “With the inherent complexity and fast-changing threat
elements in West Africa's security space, the integrated threat management in this context
will surely be an indispensable tool for ECOWAS to be ahead of the menace." Likewise,
Participant 9 indicated that "The concept is long overdue. Seriously, it is a 'must-have' for
the ECOWAS Commission. They are responsible for the ECOWAS doctrine on security.
The integrated threat approach must be fully incorporated to match the current security
threats in the region." Participant 9 went on by lamenting that “Even the existing system
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of integration at institutional and agency levels within ECOWAS and between ECOWAS
and its close partners in the region’s security management suffers from a lack of
cooperation and inefficient coordination mechanisms.”
Participant 1 referred to the ECPF as "the 'mother document' that encompasses all
doctrinal and integration matters. However, the document seems to be a work in progress.
It is not detailed enough, lacks a precise plan with assigned departmental and individual
accountability" Participant 1 also noted that
The absence of an integrated threat approach limits ECOWAS' ability to conduct
planning to manage or to meaningfully contribute toward those new and emerging
threats to security in the region. Now externally led institutions like the G5 Sahel
and the MNJTF have a better grasp of these threats posed by violent extremist
groups in the region. They are in full control.
Coordination. Interviews conducted pointed to the need for an efficient
coordination mechanism at various levels to ensure effective implementation of the threat
integration concept. Participant 9 stated that an "effective coordination mechanism is a
vital component for any framework to operate. He added that,
I think this (coordination) may involve developing a matrix to support it. Security
analysts can then use the products from threat integration to assist decisionmakers in understanding each threat's modus operandi, critical vulnerabilities, and
how they interrelate in the operational space. Getting this right will enhance the
analytical process. You get to appreciate the security environment better for
options to be generated to deal with the problem.
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According to Participant 10, "in an integrated approach, coordination is everything."
Thomson further indicated that it is not enough to roll out a high sounding framework
without backing it up with appropriate coordination instruments to guide its
implementation." He also added that "every integrated approach hinges on information
sharing. Let me also clarify that every coordination measure will require information
sharing among the stakeholders to be effective. Participant 10 concluded that "The
ECOWAS Commission may need to be deliberate about its (coordination)
implementation, or the integrated approach will also count among the list heap of
documents awaiting attention at the headquarters."
Participant 12 explained that ECOWAS must pursue the threat integration idea
and enhance its coordination mechanisms to avoid operational confusion. She declared
that "Post integration matters that especially arise could derail the whole efforts. We can
avoid interagency and thematic confusion by establishing effective coordination
measures that focus all efforts toward attaining the overall objective." For Participant 8,
"focus on tangible and achievable goals cuts out unnecessariness and makes it easier for
planners, role players, and decision-makers to pull their capacities and capabilities
together to contain the threat."
Research Question 2
RQ2: How well is ECOWAS prepared to manage new and emerging security
problems that confront the region? I identified two main themes and seven subthemes in
RQ2. Theme 3 – ECOWAS’ preparedness has the following subthemes: force generation,
decentralization of national response mechanisms, Lack of Supranational Sanctioning
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Instrument, and coordination mechanisms. Theme 4 - ECOWAS peace and security
architecture has the following subthemes: ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework,
early warning mechanisms, and ECOWAS standby force.
Theme 3: ECOWAS Preparedness toward Managing Regional Security. All
respondents interviewed also testified to the regional organization's ability to use military
and diplomatic means to address conflicts in the region. ECOWAS preparedness toward
those interventions was, to a large extent, attributed to the institution's ability to generate
force and its decentralized national response mechanism. The respondents were equally
unanimous in acknowledging that the organization was fraught with problems that
hindered its preparatory efforts such as lack of potent supranational sanctioning
instrument, and weak coordination system.
Force generation. The force generation subtheme referred to ECOWAS'
preparatory arrangements in the context of its ability to generate a representational force
across member states whenever it anticipated the application of force to address
problems. According to Participant 4, the United Nations Charter, the United Nations
principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and the Constitutive Act of the African
Union made legitimate for ECOWAS to use force as part of its conflict management
strategy. Participant 4 also postulated that the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework
(ECPF) was given effect by a Plan of Action (PoA) that, among other arrangements,
activates the deployment of the ECOWAS Stand-By Force (ESBF).
In Participant 5's view, the ESBF has been successful in no small extent because
of the commitment of a handful of member states who have continuously played lead
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roles in troop deployments. Participant 5 cites how ECOMOG's Nigerian led preemptive
deployments in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Guinea Bissau, and the
Gambia saved the region from catastrophic civil wars. Both Participant 5 and Participant
3 asserted that, in most cases, the timely intervention of the ESBF had worked. However,
participant 6 was emphatic that ECOMOG's intervention activities were not applied
evenly across all countries. For example, Participant 6 compared how ECOWAS used
military forces to pressurize President Yahya Jammeh of the Gambia out of power
whereas, the same organization overlooked similar cases involving Guinea and Togo.
Participant 6 also capped his assertion with an example in a rhetorical question that “For
example, how do you expect President Faure Gnassingbé of Togo to allow an
organization he was leading to intervene in his country?" Therefore, it became evident
during the study that ECOWAS' resolve to apply military force in member states had
been selective. Thus, the level of each country's military and diplomatic clout determined
how it ma its security problems were managed.
Decentralization of national response mechanisms. The need to decentralize the
various national response mechanisms also came up during the interviews. Participant 7
indicated that the regional level frameworks depended so much on the information feeds
they received from the member states. He, however, revealed that virtually all member
states have a centralized national response system that does not facilitate the easy
acquisition of inputs from the suburban areas across the region. Participant 9 indicated
that having a decentralized national response network that had links with the regional
architecture will seep the information acquisition process down to grassroots levels,
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enhance policy development, and also facilitate the planning and implementation of
programs.
Participant 11 extolled ECOWAS Commission's determination to ensuring
interagency coordination among member states. He also indicated his satisfaction with
ECOWAS' cooperation with multilateral institutions toward a speed response to conflicts
in the region. Participant 11 added that through the West African Police Information
System (WAPIS) program, member states, ECOWAS Commission, the International
Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), and the European Union (EU) were
collaborating in a centralized data sharing arrangements to hinder criminality in the
region. Participant 12 agreed with Participant 11 but also pointed out that the centralized
option for the WAPIS program faced take-off delays due to technical, administrative, and
financial constraints. Hence, a decentralized option was, thus, pursued as a stop-gap
measure.
Lack of potent supranational sanctioning instrument. The interviews revealed
that many intervention initiatives were frustrated by leaders and representatives of
member states who thought their parochial interests would be unfavorably affected. In
Participant 11's view, ECOWAS lacked a robust supranational sanctioning mechanism
for whipping defaulting member states. He cited Nigeria's arbitrary border closures in
defiance of the organization's agreements and protocols.
Participant 6 asserted that leaders with clout among the organization's
membership mostly exhibited defiance and impunity. Participant 10 mentioned "Nigeria,
Togo, Guinea, and Guinea Bissau as some of the countries that have exhibited that
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nonconformist posture without being appropriately sanctioned." Participant 10 further
posited that:
ECOWAS interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Gambia, and Mali
succeeded because their respective leaders - Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, Foday
Sankoh, Yahya Jammeh, and Capt Amadou Sanogo either did not or might have
lost favor among the influential members of the organization at the time.
Coordination mechanisms. The concept of coordination as a critical component
in the successful conduct of planning and preparatory works kept popping up in all the
interviews. All the respondents held the view that ECOWAS, as a regional organization,
ECOWAS needed a robust coordination mechanism that could galvanize member states
to support its preparatory activities. Data gathered indicated that ECOWAS’ coordination
role was central to the planning and preparation of the region's security management
arrangements. However, for coordination to be effective, it needed to end with each
component fulfilling its obligations and responsibilities toward achieving the common
goal. For instance, Participant 6, while lamenting the organization’s coordination
problems, indicated that "ECOWAS is just a secretariat, they can only coordinate."
Participant 10 affirmed Participant 6's position when he stated the following: "as much as
possible, what ECOWAS can do is to play facilitating the role of giving that kind of
coordinating platform, but it is the member states who ultimately call the shots."
Participant 9 stated that "many ECOWAS Commission's major planning
programs dare thwarted by disinterest from some key member states. In this case, all the
coordination activities are nip in the bud." He also added that "one of the reasons for
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transforming the ECOWAS Secretariat into ECOWAS Commission was to de-emphasis
winding conventions and protocols by enhancing the Commission's ability to coordinate
decisions from the ECOWAS Authority without passing them through lengthy national
ratification processes." He, however, quizzed, "but what do we see going on now?" It is
the same Heads of Governments who paralyze the process through other means like
withholding troop contributions and deployments, slow-paced diplomatic accesses, and
squeezing funds for the commission's preparatory works." He concluded.
Theme 4: ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture. Under this theme,
respondents discussed ECPF. The ECPF included early warning mechanisms, ECOWAS’
anti-terrorism plan, and ECOWAS’ management of intraregional and cross-regional
initiatives. All the respondents acknowledged that, despite all the security management
mechanisms, the ECOWAS peace and security architecture continued to face many
challenges. In this regard, Participant 3 stated that "ECOWAS as an institution may have
to play its role, but there are obvious implementation challenges with some of these
documents. There are also lots of issues with resources; member states' political will
especially." Participant 9 indicated that:
Ironically, some of these security management mechanisms represent the same
issues that confront the ECOWAS security architecture. Consider the difficulties
ECOWAS goes through with member states any time it has to mobilize troops
from its rapid response standby force. Also, look at the struggle it undergoes in
mobilizing funding and logistical support to kick-start its counterterrorism plans.
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The mountain of problems it has in dealing with various rival counterterrorism
groups across the region will help you understand my point.
ECOWAS conflict prevention framework. In ECOWAS' strife to addressing the
difficulties it has with managing security issues in the region, it, in January 2008, crafted
the ECPF to guide its conceptualization, implementation, and evaluation of conflict
prevention protocols, agreements, and instruments. The documents included the 1977
Accord on Non‐Aggression and Defence (ANAD), The 1981 Protocol on Mutual
Assistance and Defence (PMAD); The 1993 Revised Treaty of ECOWAS; The
Declaration of the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation, and Manufacture of
Light Weapons; and The 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace‐keeping, and Security. The ECPF articulates
measures for implementing the provisions of the 1999 Mechanism with a focus on
conflict prevention, human security, and peacebuilding.
Participant 5 listed some of the related ECPF objectives include: Mainstreaming
conflict prevention into ECOWAS' operational mechanism; deepening conceptual
understanding of conflict prevention; strengthening member states' and CSOs' conflict
prevention and peacebuilding capacity; and enabling ECOWAS' planning and execution
capabilities in proactive, integrated conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies.
Participant 5 also took a more in-depth insight into what he thought the human security
aspect of what the ECPF was to achieve and concluded:
If you look at current or modern security issues, we are looking at issues of
human security. If I say human security, I mean people-centered security,
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whereby we are looking at people's needs. In terms of the ECOWAS security
management system, there has to be a drastic shift from the state-centered
approach to the human-centered approach. We can make a lot of progress in
managing our security system when we address people's needs.
In the same light, Participant 12 indicated that "ECOWAS has demonstrated some
capacity to apply a combination of military and non-military approaches to preventing,
mitigating, or containing conflicts in the region." She cited ECOWAS’ use of a
combination of military threats and diplomatic engagements to force Captain Amadou
Sanogo of Mali and Yahya Jammeh of the Gambia to hand over power without furthering
conflicts in 2012 and 2016 respectively. However, she added her voice to the human
security imperatives the ECPF is meant to highlight by asserting:
The ECPF seeks to ensure regional security from the grassroots; hence, the phrase
"from an ECOWAS of States to an ECOWAS of the people" became the
organization's key slogan. Accordingly, ECOWAS designed the framework to
focus more on human security with an emphasis on conflict prevention through a
comprehensive peacebuilding strategy.
Early warning mechanisms. According to Participant 8, ECOWAS mainly
operates a dualistic Early Warning system comprising internal and external sources for
getting timely information on threats to security in the region. ECOWAS established its
internal Early Warning system as part of Article 58 of the revised Treaty and the Protocol
Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution,
Peacekeeping, and Security. The external sources comprised the organization's
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partnership with the ECOWAS member states, other regional organizations. The external
sources also included Civil Society Organizations like WANEP and the Reacting to Early
Warning and Response Data in West Africa (REWARD), which is part of a broader U.S.
Government Early Warning and Response Partnership (EWARP).
The information on the ECOWAS Early Warning System was corroborated by
Participants 1, 2, and 6. Participants 6 and 1 were unanimous in the ECOWAS Early
Warning System's effectiveness. They also added that the existing cooperation among the
various stakeholders was being coordinated by the WAPIS. WAPIS is a data-sharing
institution created in 2010 under the auspices of the European Development Fund to
monitor transnational crime and terrorism in West Africa.
The ECOWAS standby force. The ECOWAS standby force is one of the critical
components of the ECPF. Participant 9 assessed the long-standing capacity problems of
ECOWAS, and instead demanded ECOWAS to explore the possibilities in deepening its
security cooperation with the AU on the African Standby Force (ASF) to mitigate its
challenges. Participant 9 eulogized the successes of the ESF among other Regional
Communities’ standby for arrangements and clarified that:
The ESF is the ECOWAS component of the ASF and is under the Operational
Control of the African Union. Per the AU policy doctrine, each Regional
Community on the continent was to compose a regional standby contingent,
comprising multidisciplinary military, police and civilian components, ready to be
deployed to intervene in critical security situations. The ESF may need to
leverage on the standby arrangement with the ASF to enhance its capacity.

101
Participant 7 was with the opinion that the Standby Forces concept needed an
overhaul to make it more effective. He called for better coordination measures and
stakeholder cooperation to facilitate cross-regional support among the various Regional
Communities. He illustrated that:
If, for example, ECOWAS needed troop or logistical assistance for imminent
deployment, they should contact SADC directly without passing through the AU
bureaucracies." "Although this might require some bilateral arrangements among
the Regional Communities, it will ease a lot of pressure on them and their troopcontributing countries.
Participant 2 began by stating that ECOWAS' preparedness toward internecine
conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone was especially commendable. However, he
lamented that “the organization's overdependence on external support, lead-nation, and a
few regular troop-contributing countries; while a bulk of the member states stood aloof,
engendered fatigue among these particular group of stakeholders." He expressed his
reservations about the ESF's ability to contain new and emerging security threats. He
indicated that "ECOWAS needs to do something very drastic to be able to turn the tide in
its favor. Also, in line with Participant 7's viewpoint, Participant 2 said that.
Even though ECOWAS has many security-related protocols and agreements, deep
operational experience, and better security management record when compared
with other Regional Communities on the continent, the evolving nature of threats
in the region has overwhelmed those capacities. The organization has bitter
experiences with handling the Malian crisis, management of terrorist threats in the
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region, and the lusterless external donor support. ECOWAS may, therefore, have
to review its support base to include bilateral arrangements with sister Regional
Communities on the continent to enhance the ESF's capacity.
Research Question 3
RQ3 - What implementation challenges does ECOWAS face in its current scheme
of conflict management strategy? This RQ had one theme, three subthemes, and two subsubthemes. The subthemes comprised non-adherence to existing agreements and
protocols, funding, and external interference. The theme of external interference had
direct interference and indirect interference as sub-sub-themes.
Theme 5: Mandate Implementation Challenges. Respondents cited the
mandate subthemes like non-adherence to existing agreements and protocols, funding,
and external interference as some of the factors militating against ECOWAS’ ability to
implement the action plan for its conflict prevention framework.
Nonadherence to existing agreements and protocols. ECOWAS’ adopted the
ECPF in its quest to operationalize the 1999 Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security. Member states'
adherence to existing security protocols and agreements was considered as vital to
mandate implementation by all respondents. Participant 6 summed it succinctly as
follows:
I think, for me, if you read the various protocols or mechanisms, for instance, on
peacekeeping, conflict management, and all that, you will realize that it is clear.
In terms of the strategy, I think my issue is probably with their implementation.
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Even when you take the ECPF, it is clearly defined, and it is good that it is not
just ECOWAS itself going out there to implement all these strategies but also
about the involvement of key stakeholders – the member states.
Participant 10 indicated that "the protocol that set up of the security architecture
are all available, but the implementation largely also rests with member states." He also
expressed disquiet at some member state leaders who were so influential in the region
that they could frustrate any effort by ECOWAS when they felt implementation could
threaten their interests. Participant 10 also mentioned Guinea, where many attempts by
ECOWAS to mediate electoral disputes were rejected and eventually postponing the
elections. Participant 9 expressed similar sentiments by stating that, "one single most
troublesome challenge to ECOWAS' mandate implementation is the apathy of some
member states' and even sometimes, the mightier ones who deliberately outmaneuver the
organization and obstructing its efforts.
Funding. The low financial capacity of governments in the region has hampered
their ability to support ECOWAS’ programs. For instance, Participant 5 indicated that
many countries in the West African community could not honor their financial
obligations to ECOWAS because of their low financial capacities. Participant 9 submitted
that "The region's low economic base is part of the reasons for its inability to finance
ECOWAS programs adequately. Governments would normally prioritize their internal
security over funding the organization."
Notes taken during the interviews generally pointed to a direct correlation
between ECOWAS funding problems and its ability to implement programs. Participant 4
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expressed the view that “implementation of new frameworks by ECOWAS has been
hindered by the organization's inability to generate funds.” Participant 2 indicated that the
funding problems have resulted in ECOWAS, soliciting for financial assistance from
entities outside the region like the UN, EU, AU, and more affluent countries like the
United States and some in Europe. Participant 2 added that most of this support either
failed or came with donor conditionalities that were not favorable to the organization's
core objectives.
Participant 4 summed-up the effects of ECOWAS’ weak financial capacity on its
ability to implement mandates. He said, "We can have all the robust measures or
whatever, but if we don't have the internally generated funds to implement them, they
will just be on the shelves, and nothing will happen." Thus, the prevailing fragile
economic circumstances among ECOWAS member states have contributed to their
inability to fully fund the organization's budget. The state of affairs has compelled
ECOWAS to depend mainly on unreliable foreign support and conditionality, which
ultimately affects effective mandate implementation.
External interference: The ECOWAS region has a long history of foreign
interference in its internal affairs. Interviewees made references to external intrusion as
an inhibiting factor in ECOWAS' mandate implementation. Generally, respondents made
two significant allusions to foreign interventions affecting ECOWAS' programs. These
have been sub-subthemed as direct interference and indirect interference. The two
constructs are, however, not wholly distinct from each other. They are interrelated and
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are manipulated by the perpetrators in a mutually reinforcing manner to achieve their
objectives.
Direct external interference. Direct external interference referred to instances of
unsolicited physical deployments of military and paramilitary troops, and intelligence
services by countries outside the ECOWAS region. Participant 9 stated that "By directly
deploying combat military units to Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, and perhaps, Burkina Faso, and
Niger, France is undermining ECOWAS' mandate in the region; those deployments are
also tantamount to a regional invasion." He added that "I don't care whether they sought
the consent of the individual countries or not; that’s another matter altogether.”
Participant 8 deplored the establishment and operations of the French-led G5 Sahel
infantry forces in the West African Sahel region and declared that it undermines the trust
people have in ECOWAS as the preeminent organization with the mandate to deploy
troops across the region.
Indirect external interference. Indirect external interference referred to covert and
overt activities as well as wide-ranging networks of security cooperation established by
foreign nations with ECOWAS member states. Participant 12 described indirect external
interference as "exploitative and more fatal to ECOWAS mandate implementation than
the physical deployments of troops in the Sahel or the Maghreb regions; since this is how
they (foreign powers) weaken the cohesion of the union." Participant 8 saw the external
interference in West Africa as reminiscent of the power play of the Congo. He further
explained that "In this ECOWAS region, however, I see the competition for
preponderance between France and Nigeria. While Nigeria might represent ECOWAS'

106
interest, France is engaged in protecting its neocolonial interest." Participant 8 further
indicated that "Although there are others like the United States, the United Kingdom, and
even China involved, these countries’ intrusion is not as pervasive as that of France. The
effects of their activities on the region's stability are enormous."
Participant 10 explained his view on external interference as follows: "G5- Sahel
is being funded and spearheaded by France. Some of the countries involved in G5 Sahel
are not even part of ECOWAS. ECOWAS has no control, and it has no troops in the
Sahel." Participant 10 went on to add that, "Countries like France and others have their
interest that dictates some of the policies. Whether those policies affect ECOWAS or not,
they don't care. It's only about achieving their aims." Participant 2 explained his notion of
indirect external interference when he said, "look at the information of the G5 Sahel. You
can also link that to our colonial history where France and some member states have
post-colonial arrangements binding them to channel resources to G5 Sahel rather than
ECOWAS."
Participant 5's comment on the interference was about how former colonial
masters extended their rivalries than in Europe to Anglo-Franco-Lusophone divide in
West Africa. He indicated that “this divide has become pervasive. It has therefore made it
difficult for member states to have consensus on matters of common interest.” Regarding
the colonial divide, Participant 9 said that "You see, the seed of division sowed by
France, Portugal, and the United Kingdom in the region have gain roots, and they
continue to nourish it to sustain their exploitative activities." He added that "Some of
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these European countries see ECOWAS as a stumbling block and would do anything to
degrade its influence in the region."
Summary
In this chapter, I discussed the setting for the research, the demographics, data
collection, and data analysis. I provided the outcomes of the analysis of 12 interviews
conducted and documents reviewed from the data gathered. Using the NVivo software, I
established five main themes, 14 subthemes, and two sub-subthemes for the analysis. I
also applied a thematic analysis framework to identify themes and interpret the data
collected.
In RQ1, participants testified to ECOWAS’ effectiveness in its use of military and
diplomatic means to address conflicts in the region. Participants indicated that, while
ECOWAS' ability to generate expeditionary force was comparably more effective than
other regional communities on the continent, the organization’s effectiveness in the
management of new and emerging threats to regional security needed improvement.
Also, three respondents stated that ECOWAS is required to be empowered with a more
potent supranational sanctioning instrument to be able to bring recalcitrant leaders to
order. Five participants admitted that adopting an integrated threat concept will enhance
ECOWAS' security management and also advocated for a more pragmatic coordination
system to improve the organization's effectiveness in the region's security management.
RQ2 sought responses to ECOWAS preparedness in managing new and emerging
security problems in the region. Participants mentioned the ECOWAS Commission as the
critical branch at the ECOWAS headquarters that was mandated by the peace and
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security provisions of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty to manage regional security.
Participants highlighted the contrast between ECOWAS’ better preparedness toward
interventions in internecine conflicts and its lackluster approach toward the new and
emerging threats to security. The ECOWAS’ overdependence on external support, a lead
nation like Nigeria, and a few regular troop-contributing countries engendered resource
fatigue among these particular groups of stakeholders.
RQ3 related to the implementation challenges that confront ECOWAS in its
management of regional security problems. Especially the new and emerging threats to
peace and stability. Responses from theme five mainly addressed this research question.
Generally, responses from interviews and documents analyzed recognized ECOWAS’
successes, especially; containing civil wars in the region. Participants also acknowledged
the various regional initiatives from both member states and CSOs in strengthening
ECOWAS’ resolve to manage the security challenges.
All 12 participants acknowledged the organization’s failure to replicate its
renowned ability to manage civil wars and also admitted its inability to address the new
and emerging threats to security like violent extremism, terrorism, cross-border crimes,
cybercrime, and transnational organized crime plaguing the region. It appeared that the
adoption of integrated threat management as an analytical concept could give impetus for
operationalizing the ECPF and consequently enhance ECOWAS' ability to mitigate the
threats to regional security. It also emerged from the responses that the coordination
measures to facilitate effective implementation of the ECPF were inadequate. Participants
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admitted the need for additional physical coordination mechanisms with a framework for
accountability at all levels of responsibility to ensure its effectiveness.
In Chapter 5, I provided my interpretations and findings from the themes as they
related to the research questions. I then discussed the limitations of the study and made
recommendations for adoption by ECOWAS and future studies. I also discussed the
study's implications for social change.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
Although ECOWAS has successfully combined military deployments with
diplomatic engagements to contain internecine conflicts that bedeviled some member
states, it has continued to grapple with the sustenance of the region’s fragile peace and
democratic experiments. The emergence of new and emerging threats to peace and
security has added another layer of security threat to the existing internecine conflicts.
The twin threats of internal conflicts and new and emerging security threats have thrown
ECOWAS' strategies off-balance, rendering it ineffective (Aning & Pokoo, 2014;
Onuoha & Ezirim, 2013). The worsening security situation in West Africa has denigrated
the quality of life of its citizens (Kieh & Kalu, 2013; von Soest, & De Juan, 2018).
The purpose of this study was to explore the Economic Community of West
African States’ (ECOWAS’) approach to regional security management in West Africa.
The research was a qualitative exploratory case study. I used purposive and snowball
sampling techniques. I relied on in-depth interviews and intertextual analysis of
documents. I recruited practitioners from the ECOWAS Commission in Abuja, think
tanks/subject matter experts from WANEP, and academic researchers from KAIPTC and
NDC. The study’s focus was on understanding the ineffectiveness of ECOWAS’
approach to the region’s security challenges.
The study revealed that although ECOWAS had adopted an integrated approach
concept, it was within the cooperation and coordination of stakeholder agencies and
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institutions. No existing data indicated ECOWAS’ application of the integrated threat
management concept, nor was such a proposal found in any literature, thus justifying the
relevance of the research. Therefore, this study has proffered the application of integrated
threat management as a potent operational concept for handling the region’s security
setting's growing complexity.
Interpretation of the Findings
The study was qualitative with a focus on formative evaluation research
methodology. The methodology enhanced the depth and rigor in analyzing the themes
emerging from responses on ECOWAS’ effectiveness, preparations, and implementation
challenges in its approach to regional security management. I applied the PET and PFT to
conceptualize the problem in the context of ECOWAS’ security management strategies in
a wide range of regional and sociopolitical circumstances.
I applied the thematic analysis framework in reviewing the main themes and
subthemes to answer the RQs. Adopting the thematic analysis framework enabled me to
substantiate crosscutting issues from responses to the RQs. I identified two main themes
and six subthemes for RQ1; two main themes and seven subthemes for RQ2; and one
central theme, three subthemes, and two sub-subthemes for RQ3.
Research Question 1
RQ1 was, how effective is ECOWAS’ current approach to security management
in the region?
Theme 1: Effectiveness of ECOWAS. Responses gathered on the effectiveness
of ECOWAS in regional security management indicated that the organization has been
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successful in dealing with member states’ internal conflicts but unsuccessful in managing
the new and emerging threats to security afflicting the region. Apart from responses from
the interviews, there were commentaries from academia, security experts, and
practitioners on ECOWAS' effectiveness in shifting or adjusting strategies to contain
security problems in the region (Odobo et al., 2017; Lar, 2009). Other researchers also
established that ECOWAS was the only entity with strong organizational capacity and the
mandate to conduct peace operations across the region (Odobo et al., 2017). Findings
from the data gathered for this study, however, indicated that the organization needed to
rethink its response to asymmetric security threats like violent extremism, transnational
organized crimes, and terrorism that continue to ravage the region. Theme 1 had the
following subthemes: successful interventions, unsuccessful interventions, and
involvement of CSOs.
I identified two main perspectives for respondents’ assessments of the
accomplishment of the successful intervention subtheme. While one view centered on the
intervention processes, the other was aligned to the mission's end-state to evaluate its
success. Although both the process and the end-state criteria provided a sound basis for
assessment, it is the former that determines the worth of the latter in peace operations.
Hence, the process becomes weightier in evaluating ECOWAS' effectiveness. In
explaining the standards required for assessing what constitutes successful intervention
peace operations in Africa, Rodriguez (2015) indicated that experts have associated the
most successful peacekeeping missions with effective political strategies, clear goals, and
expectations, and were well trained and funded.
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Responses for the unsuccessful intervention subtheme mainly consisted of
ECOWAS’ lackluster handling of new and emerging security threats in the region. The
Boko Haram terror crisis, the terror crisis in the Sahel and Maghreb regions of West
Africa, the thriving transnational organized crime, and cybercrime in the region came up
as problems that ECOWAS had failed in addressing. Some of the reasons assigned for
ECOWAS’ failures included the ineffectiveness of its conflict management strategies,
interferences of powerful foreign countries in the region’s security affairs, and the
overlapping nature of the crisis beyond the organization’s jurisdiction.
All the reasons adduced for unsuccessful interventions subtheme sounded
reasonable; however, the most emphasized was ECOWAS’ ineffectiveness in conflict
management strategies. The PET states that organizational structures are characterized by
stability and incrementalism; stability referred to a long period of the relatively
unchanged form (stasis), and incrementalism, a radical change over a short period
(Desmarais, 2019; Sabatier & Weible, 2018, p. 55). By inference, ECOWAS' period of
stasis (while managing intrastate and election-related conflicts) was punctuated by new
and emerging security threats that require the adoption of the appropriate conflict
management strategy to handle.
Respondents called on ECOWAS to increase the involvement of CSOs and
improve its engagement of regional and subregional groups operating in the region’s
peace and security space. The call was right since information acquisition is a critical
factor in the planning and execution of security operations. CSOs such as WANEP and
REWARD have the reach and access to vital information on security-related matters in
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the region up to the grassroots level. Forging greater collaboration with them can enhance
the triggering of early warning of imminent threats to peace and security and improve
ECOWAS' operational planning process.
Theme 2: Integrated Threat Management. Just having a plan does not provide
an adequate guarantee for the successful conduct of security operations. It is the
employment of an appropriate concept for the planning process that ensures the plan's
thoroughness and credibility. It emerged during the data collection that ECOWAS had
not been practicing the integrated threat management approach as part of its regional
security planning strategy. It also appeared that the system of integrated approach
practiced by the ECOWAS Commission pertained to creating stronger bonds among
military, police, and civilians in the planning and execution of operations. For example,
ECOWAS had programs for strengthening interagency collaborations like the ECOWAS
Integrated Maritime Strategy and WAPIS.
Additionally, the integrated approach as envisaged in the key objectives of the
ECPF reiterated the thrust toward the interagency approach. ECOWAS crafted the
counterterrorism strategy to give effect to aspects of the ECPF. The ECOWAS
counterterrorism strategy also recognized “the linkages between terrorism and other
forms of criminality, including trans-national organized crimes” (ECOWAS, 2016f,
preamble, para. 13). Indeed, literature has established connections between these new and
emerging threats as one layer and the existing destructive conflicts as another (Aning &
Pokoo, 2014; Cherkaoui, 2017; Marc et al., 2015; Security Council Report 2011;UN
News, 2019). Therefore, it is surprising that ECOWAS failed to notice the nexus between

115
the two layers of threats to regional security for inclusion in the ECPF and the ECOWAS
counterterrorism strategy.
In planning and strategizing for security operations, continuous analysis of the
threat factor is a vital step. Planners must, therefore, keep focus continually on the threat
and avoid distractions. Setting up interagency networks and coordination systems will
help in the efficient mobilization of resources and information sharing. Such networks
and coordination systems cannot replace or diminish the importance of a threat-focused
process in security management.
It emerged from the data collection that ECOWAS lagged in having a
determinative coordination instrument that will guide the implementation of the
organization's frameworks and strategies. Even the best plan can fail if coordination
derogated. Besides that, issues regarding information sharing and interagency
competition came up as severe drawbacks to the organization's existing coordination
arrangements. Considering ECOWAS' stakeholder dynamics, both the conduct and the
implementation of the integrated threat management products will depend on an enduring
coordination arrangement to be effective. On that account, the integrated threat
management approach will require a simultaneous improvement of the existing
coordination measures to make it operational.
RQ1 was the overarching question for the study. The main objective of the
question was to ascertain how effective the ECOWAS approach has been in managing
the complex security threats confronting West Africa. It emerged that although
ECOWAS had succeeded in containing intrastate conflicts, it has been unsuccessful in its
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response to the nonconventional security threats that continued to devastate the region.
Although ECOWAS had rolled out the ECPF, a counterterrorism strategy, and some
interagency integration arrangements to contain the problem, it appeared that it failed to
consider the nexus between the two layers of threats in the entire scheme. The PFT
provides a framework of interrelated concepts, ideas, and principles. ECOWAS needs to
incorporate integrated threat management as part of the conceptual approach to enhance
the effectiveness of its security management strategy.
Research Question 2
RQ2 was, how well is ECOWAS prepared to manage new and emerging security
problems that confront the region?
Theme 3: ECOWAS Preparedness toward Managing Regional Security.
Successful implementation of security plans hinges on how thorough the preparation
stage was carried out. Discussion on the theme revolved around ECOWAS’ ability to
deploy troops, decentralization of national response mechanisms, lack of supranational
sanctioning instrument, and coordination mechanisms. Respondents unanimously
assessed ECOWAS' preparation toward regional security management as a mixture of
successes and failures.
On the organization's ability to generate expeditionary force to maintain or restore
peace and security across the region, it was realized that ECOWAS was comparatively
successful in intrastate conflicts than in the new and emerging threats to regional security.
Planning is not only a prerequisite for the conduct of security operations; it traverses the
entire process since there must be a continuous reevaluation of the situation. The
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planning stage dovetails into preparation, so without its constant evaluation, a gap created
can reduce the effectiveness of the preparatory phase of the operation. The planningpreparation gap became apparent as many interventions rolled out by ECOWAS to
manage the region's security failed to suppress the new and emerging threats that have
overwhelmed substantial parts of the area.
The study results revealed that the centralized nature of national response
mechanisms among ECOWAS member states hampered smoother preparations toward
the execution of the organization's operational mandate. Also, the weak bond between
national response networks and ECOWAS Commission led to delays and, sometimes,
abortive security missions. ECOWAS realized the gap and introduced the WAPIS and
ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy interagency coordination programs and
initiatives like the ECOWAS Vision 2020 - a people-centered and people-driven
document to reduce the state-centric tendencies among members. ECOWAS
Commission, the implementing department of ECOWAS-led security missions, relies
heavily on national institutions for technical, administrative, and financial support for
preparatory activities. The ECOWAS Commission would have to fashion out a
mechanism to sustain the momentum of the initiatives it has rolled out toward enhancing
integration.
It emerged from the study that member states' egoistic attitude and neglect to
honor conventions, protocols, and agreements contributed to ECOWAS' inability to carry
out some missions. Instances, where some countries could decide not to comply with the
organization's resolutions or cooperate with the ECOWAS Commission, they undermine

118
the entire security management process by honoring their contribution toward planned
missions. The need for a potent supranational sanctioning instrument must be taken
seriously. ECOWAS can check those acts of impunity by applying the instrument to
sanction defaulting member states.
Coordination is the fulcrum for all preparatory activities. For coordination to be
effective, it needs a sound planning doctrine that is understood and committed to by all
stakeholders, proper communication channels, and a functioning framework for
accountability at all levels. Even though ECOWAS had some coordination arrangements
in place, they lacked those qualities. Respondents lamented that member states'
commitment to ECOWAS' security management activities was not enabling. Also, the
lack of functioning accountability framework allowed security architecture players and
other stakeholders to abdicate responsibilities since they could easily shift the blame
elsewhere.
Theme 4: ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture. The ECOWAS revised
treaty of 1993 incorporated issues on security, conflict resolution, and giving the primary
responsibility for the full and effective implementation of strategy with member states.
The 2019 ECOWAS Counterterrorism Action Plan also maintains the primary
responsibility for implementing the plan with member states (ECOWAS, 1993;
ECOWAS, 2019c). Although ECOWAS has developed additional strategies and
frameworks like the ECOWAS Revised Treaty of 1993 and the ECOWAS
Counterterrorism Action Plan, all those initiatives were mostly a regurgitation of previous
arrangements. There were no significant shifts that strengthened the ECOWAS
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Commission's remit in security management. Consigning the ECOWAS Commission to
coordination roles while assigning the responsibility for implementation to member states
have contributed to many instances where the member states pick and choose which
security threat needed urgent attention.
It emerged from some of the documents reviewed that some ECOWAS
governments' neglect, mistakes, and complicities in the spread of terror threats and
violent extremism by groups like the Boko Haram, AQIM, and other criminal and terror
affiliates operating in the Sahel region (Feldman, 2009; Okolo & Akubo, 2019). Also,
doctrinal differences among the member states will pose enormous challenges for
ECOWAS in coordinating nonconventional operations because countries in the region
have unique tactics, techniques, and procedures for asymmetric conflicts. Additionally,
some member states were identified as members of external organizations like G5 Sahel,
MNJTF, and the LCBC, thereby complicating the chain of command and operational
procedures. The implication is that member states will encounter challenges relating to
operational doctrine, conflict of interest, and command and control, which are critical
elements in leading the implementation of strategies.
The ECOWAS Commission stands in a better position to plan, coordinate, and
lead the implementation of peace and security operations. The PFT provides a framework
for managing interrelated concepts, ideas, and principles to deal with "unanticipated or
unintended consequences of previous policy designs" (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 124).
The ECOWAS Commission needs to be given Operational Control and Tasking
Authority statuses for all mission execution components to enable it to employ the peace
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and security architecture under a unified command and control to implement its mandate
effectively. The ECPF will need to be enhanced with a threat-focused conceptual
approach in standardized operating procedures as well as synchronizing the headquarters
and the ESBF elements' efforts.
Research Question 3
RQ3 was, what implementation challenges does ECOWAS face in its current
scheme of conflict management strategy?
Theme 5: Mandate Implementation Challenges. The susceptibility of West
Africa to the cataclysmic global security setting has contributed to the region's fluid
security threat landscape. Consequently, ECOWAS has, over the years, rolled out one
peace and security initiative after another to deal with the problems found in its planning
and implementation reviews. It was, thus, not unexpected when respondents readily
pointed out weaknesses in the existing peace and security architecture that needed
rectification.
Although respondents cited problems like non-adherence to existing agreements,
funding, and external interference, it surfaced that the ECOWAS Commission needed to
review its operational frameworks and conceptual approach to match the ever-growing
challenges to the region's security. Every diplomatic environment must anticipate
nonconformities for appropriate measures to be put in place to deal with them. Member
states' non-adherence to agreements and protocols could, hence, be addressed by
developing convincing conflict management alternatives that can mitigate and eventually
contain the problem.
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Respondents indicated that funding ECOWAS missions were one of the major
challenges the institution faced. There are several reasons for ECOWAS' funding
problems, including the region's low economic base that has made weaker member states
incapable of meeting their financial obligations to the organization and donor fatigue or
failures. ECOWAS will continue to encounter funding problems so far as the region's
weak economy combines with the double-layered threats to peace and security to form a
vicious cycle lingers. Also, the ECPF has 14 sets of key issue areas of focus referred to as
14 Components (Atuobi, 2010).
ECOWAS objectives were too many. Considering the complexities of the security
setting of West Africa, a focused approach could be accomplished through a piecemeal or
limited objective approach. For example, the ECPF implementation could be in phases,
and each phase allotted a set of key focus areas for accomplishment. The limited
objective approach will also facilitate thoroughness and enhance financial prudence.
ECOWAS' overreliance on donor support to fund its programs and operations is
not sustainable. The organization will continue to encounter financial difficulties since
the funding problems have become intractable, and donors get demotivated when they
don't see results. Similarly, Nigeria, which usually volunteered lead-nation role for most
ECOWAS peace operations missions and bearing the bulk of the organization's
bureaucracies at its headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria, is saddled with combating the Boko
Haram terror group. ECOWAS headquarters needs to consider a more effective security
management strategy to motivate donors and find efficient means to get recalcitrant
member states to honor their financial obligations. ECOWAS may also collaborate with
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the UN to support its missions with enabling units like logistics, transport, aviation,
engineering, and Explosive Ordinance Disposal.
The fragility of West African economies and the countries' colonial history are
contributing to the region's susceptibility to external influences of various forms.
Respondents indicated that the external interferences affecting ECOWAS’ security
management system appear directly and indirectly. ECOWAS’ dependence on external
donor funding support for the conduct operations while also blaming foreign interference
for its operational failures sounds paradoxical. ECOWAS needs to realize that, in
international diplomacy, the saying that “there is no such thing as a free lunch” and quid
pro quo are enduring principles. ECOWAS and its member states need to find ways to
reduce donor dependency syndrome by widening its internal funding sources and
ensuring a prudent financial system.
Limitations of the Study
The study type was a qualitative exploratory case study based on a formative
evaluation research methodology. The study focused on the effectiveness of ECOWAS’
regional security management approach in the face of the further complications created
by the emergence of new and emerging threats to security in West Africa. Although the
study delved into the details of the subject matter, it has some unavoidable limitations.
First, West Africa is linguistically diverse with French, English, and Portuguese
as major national languages. However, I used English to collect data throughout the
process from participants, including those from non-Anglophone countries at ECOWAS
headquarters. The situation could have affected the quality of the response since the non-
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Anglophone participants would have been better expressing their views in their
respective national languages. To mitigate the problem, I carried out more follow-on
questions with the non-Anglophone participants to get into details with them and to also
enable them to clarify their views.
Second, the study would have benefitted from the diversity of the region if I had
visited ECOWAS offices in one or two more countries. I would have preferably selected
one Francophone and one Lusophone country each for a visit. However, due to financial
constraints, I was only able to travel to Ghana and Nigeria for the data collection. To
make up for the dialectal deficits, I purposively skewed my interview schedules by
shortlisting and prioritizing respondents from Francophone and Lusophone countries at
the ECOWAS headquarters.
Recommendations
There are twofold recommendations for this study. The first segment pertains to
recommendations for future research, and the second, related to ECOWAS headquarters.
However, some recommendations may apply to both sides.
Recommendations for Future Research
Although this study addresses a gap in the literature, there are other areas of equal
importance that need scholarly intervention to augment ECOWAS’ security management
strategy. Firstly, future research can delve into a new Strategic Concept for the ECOWAS
security management system. With ECOWAS implementing integrated interagency
security management initiatives, there is the need to adopt a new strategic concept to
strengthen its strategic foundations and relationship with member states, partners, and
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competing organizations engaging in peace operations in the region. A new strategic
concept will create the platform for strategic reorientation and consensus-building among
stakeholders in the light of the growing complexity in the region's security environment.
Another potential area for future research is the ECOWAS framework for
responsibility and accountability. Although ECOWAS has adopted several protocols,
agreements, conventions, and memoranda of understanding, it grapples with a clear and
coherent framework that guides effective management of responsibility and
accountability at all levels. The responsibility and accountability framework will
facilitate organizational consistency in evaluation, prompting, and sanctioning systems to
stimulate responsible and accountable ethics.
Recommendations for ECOWAS Headquarters
It was part of the study's objectives to contribute to improving ECOWAS' security
management capabilities. Aside from future research, it is pertinent also to proffer some
recommendations for ECOWAS headquarters. ECOWAS needs to:


Incorporate the integrated threat management as part of the conceptual
approach to enhance the effectiveness of its security management strategy.



Cut down on headquarters bureaucracies and emphasize on threat-focused
response to its security management architecture.



Increase the involvement of CSOs.



Promote positive engagement and collaboration with other international and
subregional entities operating in the region’s peace and security space.
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Reduce donor dependency syndrome by activating alternate funding
arrangements, widening its internal funding sources, developing a plan for
getting all member states to honor their financial obligations, and ensuring
prudent financial system.



Improve the existing coordination measures to make it operational.



Establish a functioning responsibility and accountability framework for all
key appointments at all levels in its security management system.



Seek Operational Control and Tasking Authority statuses for all mission
execution components to enable it to employ the peace and security assets
under a unified command and control system for effective mandate
implementation.
Implications

Implications for Social Change
The security situation in West Africa continued to worsen as new and emerging
threats to peace and security added another layer of problems to the existing internecine
conflicts that have denigrated the quality of life in the region. The purpose of this study
was to explore the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS’) approach
to regional security management in West Africa. The main implication for positive social
change for the study will be a region with an effective security management system that
guarantees its citizens' hope and aspirations. A secured West Africa will provide
confidence for the inflow of international engagements, facilitate interstate exchanges,
and energize commercial and socio-cultural activities among its citizens.
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Implications for Policy Making and Professional Practice
The study was conducted based on ECOWAS’ inability to effectively manage the
growing complexity of the security situation in West Africa. However, the
commensurability of regional security management systems makes the study receptive to
replications outside the context within which it was conducted. Thus, the study has
implications for policymaking and professional practice for other regional security
organizations and homeland security professionals.
Policy making. Due to the increase in global security threats, many regional
organizations have added regional security management to their remits or supported
responsible institutions to contain the menace. It was evident from this study that while
member states were given the responsibility to implement the mandate, the ECOWAS
Commission was only assigned a coordination role. This policy decision needs to be
reversed since splitting command and control in security operations often leads to
confusion in planning and execution. It is also paradoxical for member states from whom
the problems emanate to be the same with the primary responsibility to implement
mission mandates to manage the impasse. Therefore, the responsibility for mandate
implementation should be taken from member states and assigned to the ECOWAS
Commission. Then a framework for accountability could be established for the
Commission to be answerable to member states on mandate implementation.
Professional practice. The study challenges the ability of staff officers at the
ECOWAS Commission and other regional and national security management
departments to adopt an integrated conceptual approach that is threat-focused. Adopting
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an integrated doctrine will add another security paradigm to the existing initiatives of the
regional and various national security institutions. The study will also inspire professional
security officers to explore the threat-focused concept for further prospects in the security
management industry.
Summary
In this chapter, I started with an introduction in which I provided a brief insight
into the background to the problem, highlighted the purpose of the study, and described
the research methodology and data collection process. I then presented the interpretation
of findings using themes that emerged from each RQ and also submitted the limitations
of the study and how I addressed them in the course of the study. I proceeded to proffer
recommendations for future research, proposals for ECOWAS headquarters and indicated
the implications the study can have on social change, policymaking, and professional
practice.
Conclusion
West Africa faces two layers of threats to peace and security in the region. The
first layer of threat to security is the intrastate conflicts based upon which ECOWAS
quite successfully added regional security remit and its original mandate of promoting
regional economic integration. The second layer of threat to security is the new and
emerging themes like violent extremism, terrorism, cross-border crimes, and
transnational organized crimes combined with the intrastate conflicts to complicate the
region’s security dynamics.
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This qualitative research focused on ECOWAS’ effectiveness in managing twin
threats and threats. I drew the findings from this study from face-to-face in-depth
interviews and intertextual analysis of documents using the thematic analysis framework.
I applied the purposive sampling and the snowball data collection techniques to recruit 12
participants from the academia, subject matter experts, and practitioners who volunteered
for the study from KAIPTC and WANEP in Ghana, and ECOWAS Headquarters and
NDC in Nigeria.
The study established that ECOWAS had drafted security policy documents and
frameworks, adopted several agreements and memoranda of understanding and rolled out
an integrated interagency security management system to strengthen coordination and
information sharing among its agencies and partners. Similarly, several documents lauded
ECOWAS as the best performing regional security organization in Africa, considering its
peace operations success, especially in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Nonetheless, the study
revealed that the organization grappled with mandate implementation challenges
emanating from member states' non-adherence to existing agreements, funding, and
external interference. The study also uncovered that ECOWAS does not operate a threatfocused conceptual approach like the integrated threat model as part of its regional
security management architecture.
The study proffered recommendations for future research and proposals for
ECOWAS headquarters. The recommendations for future studies were: new Strategic
Concept for ECOWAS security management system, and ECOWAS framework for
responsibility and accountability. The ECOWAS headquarters' recommendations
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included incorporating the integrated threat management as part of the ECOWAS
conceptual approach, emphasizing threat-focused response, improving CSOs’
involvement, and collaborating with other entities operating in the region’s security
management space. The main implication for positive social change for the study will be
an effective regional security management system that guarantees the hopes and
aspirations of its citizens and provides the confidence for the inflow of international
engagements for improved living conditions.
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Appendix A: List of Acronyms
ANAD

Agreement on Non-Aggression and Assistance in Defence

ASF

African Standby Force

AQIM

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

AU

African Union

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency

CSOs

Civil Society Organizations.

ECOMOG

ECOWAS Monitoring Group

ECOWARN ECOWAS Early Warning System Response Network
ECOWAS

Economic Community of West African States

ECPF

ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework

EIMS

ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy

EPSAO

ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture and Operations

ESBF

ECOWAS Stand-By Force

EU

European Union

EWARP

Early Warning and Response Partnership

GWOT

Global War on Terrorism

IAA

International Atomic Agency

IOM

International Organization for Migration

IRB

Institutional Review Board

JNIM

Jama’ at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin

KAIPTC

Kofi Anan International Peacekeeping Training Center

171
LCB

Lake Chad Basin

LCBC

Lake Chad Basin Commission

MNJTF

Multinational Joint Task Force

NDC

National Defence College (Nigeria)

NILS

National Institute for Legislative Studies (Nigeria)

OAU

Organization of African Unity

PCASED

Program for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development

PET

Punctuated Equilibrium Theory

PFT

Policy Feedback Theory

POA

Programme of Action

R2P

Responsibility to Protect

REWARD

Reacting to Early Warning and Response Data in West Africa

SADR

Saharan Arab Democratic Republic

SALW

Small Arms and Light Weapons

UAS

Union of African States

UEMOA

Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine

UIAS

Union of Independent African States

UN

United Nations

UNECA

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

USAID

United States Agency for International Development

WAEMU

West Africa Economic Monetary Union

WAMA

West African Monetary Agency
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WAMI

West African Monetary Institute

WANEP

West African Network for Peacebuilding

WAPIS

West African Police Information System

WMD

Weapons of Mass Destruction

POLISARIO Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro
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Appendix B: Invitation Letter to Participants
Dear … (name of participant)…
My name is Farouck Mohammed-Bashar. I am a PhD student of Public Policy and
Administration with specialization in Homeland Security Policy and Coordination at
Walden University of the United States of America. My research topic is “Integrated
Threat Management: An Alternative Approach to Regional Security System for
ECOWAS” I obtained your contact information from the Head Office, West African
Network for Peacebuilding. I wish to invite you to participate in this study as a
respondent. If you agree to participate, I will arrange an interview at a time and neutral
public location of your convenience. The interview would last for about 45 minutes and
will be formal. My goal in this study will be to get answers toward establishing the
reasons for the challenges of ECOWAS’ approach to the region’s security management
with a view to proffering an alternate approach. I can assure you that I will share the
results of the study with you. In addition, please note participation in this study is
optional, and you may withdraw at any point of the process.
I have provided further details of the study in the attached consent form. Your
signature on this form means you understand the information I presented and you want to
willingly participate. Please do not hesitate to contact me for any further clarification.

Thank you.
Farouck Mohammed-Bashar

